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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
Antitrust Implications for Mergers Involving Maverick Firms
Maverick firms are defined in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines as those firms that
may exert a disproportional competitive effect in markets where they compete. The
Guidelines mandate that mergers and acquisitions involving maverick firms be given
special consideration by the Agencies, however not much is known about maverick
firms or their competitive effects when they are acquired. The Guidelines describe
characteristics that may be present in a maverick firm, but stop short of providing
a discrete test that may be used for their identification. They are often small firms
whose acquisitions do not warrant reporting to the Agencies due to falling under
the thresholds in the Hart Scott Rodino Act, and when they are reported, they are
often difficult to identify. With the increase in acquisitions of startups and other
disruptive firms by dominant incumbents as seen in the tech sector, there is public
policy interest in assessing the possible damages or benefits that may arise in mergers
and acquisitions of maverick firms. This dissertation takes a look at two mergers in
two different industries that may shed light on these questions.
The first chapter analyzes a merger in the airline industry. Using publicly available
data from the Department of Transportation, I use a difference-in-differences and a
triple difference approach to analyze the price effects of the merger between Southwest
Airlines and AirTran Airways, two maverick firms in the airline industry. I find
anticompetitive merger-related price effects that are multiple times those of previous
merger analyses in the airline industry of non-maverick firms. The results suggest
that the merger weakened the firm’s own incentives to act as a maverick due to the
elimination of maverick competition, as well as its incentives to act as a maverick
towards other firms.
The second chapter analyzes the acquisition of a maverick firm by a non-maverick
dominant incumbent in the beer industry. I use the Nielsen Scanner database and
a difference-in-differences approach to uncover the merger-related effects on price,
quantity, and variety of offerings due to the acquisition of Goose Island by Anheuser-
Busch Inbev. A fear among policymakers is that dominant incumbents will acquire
mavericks to release competitive pressure on themselves or foreclose parts of the
relevant market to other startups. I find the contrary to be true in this acquisition,
with the incumbent firm maintaining price competition while expanding sales and
encouraging entry into the market for craft beer.
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Chapter 1 : An Introduction to Mergers Involving Maverick Firms
Within antitrust circles, the word maverick connotates a specific type of firm out-
lined in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines that has recently captured the attention of
policymakers and the general public. There is fear that firms which may be poten-
tially disruptive or may exert a disproportionately competitive influence in oligopoly
markets are being acquired by dominant incumbent firms intent on alleviating com-
petitive pressure on themselves and monopolizing markets. The most high profile
fears center on the acquisition of startups by Big Tech. For example, a potential
new search platform that may “out-google Google” may be acquired by Google in
its infancy. Instead of encouraging innovation, Google may decided to shut down
the disruptor and reduce consumer welfare by limiting choice and/or innovation and
progress.
The literature and documentation on the post-acquisition effects arising from these
takeovers is sparse for several reasons. The first is policy-related. The Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act outlines when acquisitions and mergers must be reported to the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. Due to the startup nature of
these acquisitions the dollar value paid to owners of these firms often fall below the
reporting thresholds and the Agencies never are accorded the opportunity to evaluate
the acquisitions’ competitive implications. The second is data-related. For markets
where products are provided at zero-cost, as is the case with many platforms and
two-sided markets, there is often not the traditional price-quantity metrics with which
most mergers and acquisitions are assessed. Furthermore, many of the competitive
implications, such as reduced innovation, are quality-related and are difficult to assign
a price tag or a value given available data. Third, there is no easy litmus test to
define a maverick firm. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines outline various criteria
that may be associated with maverick firms but stop short of offering any prescriptive
method to identify them, making it difficult for economists to analyze mergers under
a “maverick” lens.
How a firm becomes a maverick or develops a maverick influence in markets where
it competes is often endogenous or unobserved by the econometrician. There may be
particular managerial interactions and decisions that cause a firm to exert a maverick
influence on its competitors, or there may be intrinsic qualities to the product or the
firm that allow it to either offer a particularly innovative quality in its product(s) or a
particularly aggressive pricing strategy. Either way, a maverick firm is distinguished
from non-maverick firms because it finds these strategies to be profit maximizing,
even among collusive strategies that are preferable from a profit perspective to other
competing firms. Often a maverick cannot be predicted ex ante but can be identified
ex post. For instance, in retrospect it is clear that Apple acted as a maverick in
the smartphone market when it introduced the iPhone, that Southwest acts as a
maverick by constraining price on airfare, and that craft brewers act as mavericks in
the American beer industry by providing a high quality differentiated product and
consumption experience compared to macrobrewed lagers. While it would have been
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difficult to predict their maverick effect before their respective market entry, we are
able to clearly see their influence when we compare these firms to dominant and
incumbent firms in these various markets. It is this comparison to a non-maverick
that often allows mavericks to be revealed.
This dissertation analyzes two types of mergers involving maverick firms. The
first considers the case where a maverick firm purchases another maverick firm. Mav-
ericks may not only constrain collusion from occurring among non-maverick market
participants, but also may encourage other mavericks to remain vigorous competitors.
When a merger involves two maverick firms, the primary antitrust question is whether
the new firm will produce a strengthened maverick or a weakened maverick. We can
answer this by analyzing markets where both firms compete, which experience a loss
of competition and in particular a loss of maverick competition, as well as markets
where only the acquiring firm competes and markets where only the acquired firm
competes, which experience no loss of competition but may be better indicators if
the new firm exerts stronger or weaker competitive effects on competing firms. There
is little to suggest that a merger of non-maverick firms would affect markets where
only one of the firm competes, but in the case of a merger involving a maverick these
markets may be particularly instructive on whether or not the merger ended up cre-
ating a stronger or weaker maverick, and present insight for future antitrust analysis
involving these firms. This chapter in particular examines the airline industry and the
first merger to involve a maverick firm in the airline industry - all other literature up
through the time period studied only mergers involving non-maverick airlines. The
American airline industry also makes an interesting case study because it contains
two types of firms, categorized as low cost carriers and legacy carriers, which have
characteristics that closely align to the Guidelines’ respective definitions of mavericks
and non-mavericks.
The second chapter analyzes a merger involving the acquisition of a maverick firm
by a dominant incumbent firm in the American brewing industry. This provides a case
study that may be instructive into how Big Tech and large companies in other sectors
integrate and develop products and product spaces using acquired disruptors. The
antitrust concerns in these types of acquisitions are that, taking advantage of high
barriers to entry in an oligopolistic market, dominant firms can use acquired maverick
firms as a weapon to foreclose other competing mavericks in the relevant product space
or shut down acquired firms in order to quell innovation and competition and keep the
market power and position the dominant firm enjoyed before the maverick entered.
However, it is unclear that a firm would find this profitable or a desirable strategy. It
may also be the case, particularly in competitive markets, that the dominant firm will
leverage its existing capabilities and economies of scale to create a more aggressive
maverick and bring better, more competitively priced products to market faster, and
make them available to a larger swath of consumers than the original firm would have
been able to do. This should be lauded by both the public and the Agencies.
Finally, it must be noted that the prospect of being acquired by a dominant
incumbent firm at a premium valuation is itself an incentive to entry and incentive to
innovate. Antitrust policy that prevents or slows disruption by mavericks may have
a much greater negative welfare effect than any acquisition of a disruptive firm by
2
a bad player. In competitive markets with low barriers to entry, shutting down or
foreclosing of a market by a dominant firm through acquisition is unlikely to yield
long term permanent benefits to the acquirer and make anticompetitive conduct less
likely, highlighting the importance of good policy in encouraging free markets that
provide entrepreneurs with necessary incentives.
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Chapter 2 : Mavericks and Mergers In Concentrated Markets
2.1 Introduction
The Southwest Airlines/AirTran Airways merger is unique among recent airline merg-
ers in that it involves two low cost carriers, which typically act as maverick firms
within the airline industry.1 When a merger involves a maverick firm it is subject
to special scrutiny under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. This merger involved
two of the largest maverick firms in the American airline industry, and the largest
and second largest low-fare competitors in the top 1000 airline routes. In the second
quarter of 2010, Moss (2010) found that Southwest was the low-fare competitor in
30% of these markets and AirTran was the low-fare competitor in 15% of these mar-
kets.2 Moreover, in 1993, the Department of Transportation noted that Southwest
has a unique procompetitive effect on price and quality of service, more intense and
distinct than that of other low cost carriers. This came to be known as the Southwest
Effect (Bennett and Craun, 1993).
A merger between mavericks may create conditions that lead to an increase in
market power for the new firm and the possibility of collusion among remaining firms,
even more so than a merger of non-mavericks. This paper will investigate whether the
merger of these two maverick airlines resulted in reduced competition on the average
price of airfares.
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (DOJ, 2010) define a maverick firm in
Section 2.1.5 as “a firm that plays a disruptive role in the market to the benefit
of customers.” The Guidelines mention mavericks five separate times and accord a
merger that may involve a maverick special scrutiny. A firm may be a maverick
through competition in price, quality, quantity, or a novel business strategy. A sum-
mary of the Guidelines’ definition and description of maverick firms is below:
• Mavericks may possess a disruptive technology or business model that poses
actual or potential competition to incumbents (Section 2.1.5)
• Mavericks may have incentives that lead them to be price cutters, aggressive
competitors, or resist industry price increases (Section 2.1.5)
• Mavericks may possess the ability to quickly increase production or may be a
firm that resists industry norms or behaviors (Section 2.1.5)
• Mavericks may be responsible for fluctuations in market shares in highly con-
centrated markets (Section 5.3)
1The mergers between America West/US Airways, Delta/Northwest, United/Continental, and
US Airways/American Airlines all involved legacy carriers
2The low fare competitor is defined as the airline offering the lowest fare in the market, defined
at the city-pair level.
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• Mergers may create a new maverick firm or bestow an existing firm enhanced
incentives to lower price via cost reductions or realized efficiencies, decreasing
the likelihood of coordination (Section 10)
The elimination of a maverick firm may lead to merger-related coordinated effects
by making conditions more favorable for tacit or overt collusion. When a maverick
firm is present, a collusive group of firms may not be able to set price or some non-price
product attribute at the level they wish because the maverick will take away market
share and profits by competing aggressively and deviating from the collusive firms’
strategy. However, the elimination of a maverick firm may also lead to unilateral
effects if the maverick is the acquisition target and directly constrains the strategy of
the acquiring firm premerger. This may be through either price or non-price strategies
over which the acquiring firm may not wish to compete.
A firm may act as a maverick and later transition into a non-maverick. Some-
times a dominant firm may start out as a maverick by producing an innovative prod-
uct. Apple, currently a dominant firm in the mobile phone industry, has itself acted
as a maverick firm. The first iPhone disrupted a market dominated by Palm and
Blackberry. Now Apple itself faces maverick firms in the smartphone market from
startups located in China and Silicon Valley. In the brewing industry, craft brewers
have offered consumers a differentiated product with higher quality than what macro
brewers offered. Macro brewers responded by developing their own high quality brews
in-house, such as MillerCoors’ Blue Moon brand, and by acquiring craft brewers. To
date, Anheuser Busch-Inbev has acquired ten craft brewers in order to compete more
aggressively in the American market for beer. These examples show how a company
itself may be a maverick, become a maverick, or may act as a maverick in some
product markets and a non-maverick in others.
A maverick may also meet the demand for a lower-priced, lower-quality product
that appeals to a subset of consumers not served by incumbent firms. A simple two-
stage Hotelling model illustrates this. In period one, demand is centered at 0.5 and
distributed standard normal along the Hotelling line. Entry requires commitment to
a spot on the line and afterwards a firm may not move. All firms that enter in the
first period will position themselves at 0.5 in order to attract as many consumers as
possible with no information as to demand in future periods. In the second period,
demand changes, but is now centered at 0.4 and distributed standard normal. New
firms will enter at 0.4 to meet the new demand for the lower quality product. The
firms that entered in the first period may not move and so stay at 0.5, sharing demand
above 0.5 with the other incumbent firms and sharing demand between 0.4 and 0.5
with incumbents and entrants. Entrants share any demands for any customers below
0.4 that would like to purchase given travel costs and the Nash-Bertrand price. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
The acquisition of maverick firms has taken higher competitive importance due
to activity in the technology sector, where dominant firms such as Apple, Facebook,
Google, Microsoft, and Twitter acquire firms that develop new products that compete
with products of the acquiring firm or threaten the acquiring firms’ market position
in some way. These five tech firms alone have made approximately 600 acquisitions.
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Such acquisitions also take place in the transportation sector, where firms such as
Ford, GM, and Mercedes-Benz are acquiring green energy, mobility, and autonomous
driving companies in order to speed the development of autonomous vehicles and
new mobility services. Note that this may or may not be anticompetitive. Often
these companies acquire startups in order to reduce development time and bring new
products to market faster, in a form that better meets the demand for a larger swath
of consumers. However, they also may acquire these firms to prevent competition in
markets where the acquirers possess market power, though this concern should be
balanced by the fact that an active market for corporate control reduces risk for new
entrants and spurs innovation and entrepreneurism.
Despite the increased importance of maverick firms in many markets, there is
very little literature on their competitive effects. Coate (2006) points out that one-
sixth of cases examined by the FTC for coordinated effects between 1993 and 2003
involved maverick firms. Eckert and West (2004) analyze gasoline retailing markets
in two Canadian cities and find that price volatility is associated with the presence
of a maverick firm, whereas price stability may be associated with successful tacit
collusion. Jacobs (2001) suggests that a maverick’s strategy may be to become an
attractive acquisition target for incumbent firms in order to yield a premium for
its shareholders, noting that antitrust law may disincentivize rigorous competition
if upstarts are precluded from being acquired. Kwoka (1989) develops a theoretical
model which implies that mergers involving maverick firms have a larger effect on
industry output than mergers involving non-maverick firms.
Owings (2013) contends that maverick firms in the Guidelines should be defined
as disruptive innovators.3 Owings identifies three criteria to identify disruptive inno-
vators : (1) a worse product (in some dimension) is offered, (2) the product is priced
lower than incumbents’ products, and (3) the product meets the demand of a subset
of the market so that consumers substitute towards it. She cites Netflix as an ex-
ample, who offered a movie rental service without late fees, but required consumers
to wait for the movie to come by mail and to choose from a smaller selection than
offered by incumbents such as Blockbuster. Blockbuster did not view Netflix as a
competitive threat because its management was not able to perceive the demand for
a product such as that offered by Netflix, allowing Netflix to grow and compete in
both its original market, and eventually also in Blockbuster’s market through a wider
selection and streaming services.
Baker (2002) presents the most detailed and influential exposition on maverick
firms. He notes that coordination, when it does arise, is often imperfect and incom-
plete, and a maverick firm may have a unique role in constraining its effectiveness.
The maverick does not even have to lower price to do so; it merely needs to adopt a
more profitable strategy in not following the collusive activities of other firms in its
market.
In a merger review, (Baker, 2002) notes that the identification of maverick firms
may separate out anticompetitive and procompetitive mergers. If a merger involves
3Disruptive innovators, a term coined by Clayton Christensen, are firms that introduce a product
that performs worse than what is offered by incumbents.
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a maverick and removes the constraint on coordination imposed by the maverick,
for example through acquisition, it may be anticompetitive and should be assessed as
such. However, if there are large expected cost efficiencies from the merger, the merger
may allow the maverick to further constrain coordination in the market. Furthermore,
for mergers involving non-mavericks there may be no effect on the maverick’s strategy,
or the merger may create a maverick due to cost efficiencies. The merger may also
alter the current maverick firm’s incentives. In this last case it is not clear which way
incentives would be altered; incentives may be such that the maverick will act more
competitively, or less competitively, based on the market conditions. Lastly, a merger
of non-mavericks may exclude other firms from the market. In the case that the firm
excluded is the maverick, the merger will be anticompetitive. However, in the case
when non-maverick firms are excluded, there may be no anticompetitive effect.
This previous research leads to several questions regarding mergers and acquisi-
tions involving maverick firms. It is an empirical question as to how the merger will
affect other maverick firms as well as other competitors in the market and if these
effects are heterogeneous. It is also an empirical question as to how the new incen-
tives of the merged firm affect its own conduct. This line of research is particularly
relevant due to the increase in acquisition activity involving firms that are not com-
pelled by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to be reported to the Agencies–as pointed out
by Wollmann (2019).
This paper will endeavor to answer these questions within the context of a merger
in the airline industry. Section 2 describes the U.S. Airline Industry and which firms
in it may be described as mavericks. Section 3 outlines a merger among two mavericks
firms in the airline industry, Southwest and AirTran. Section 4 describes the data
and variables I will use and Section 5 presents a standard merger retrospective model
and event study. Section 6 addresses possible issues stemming from selection. Section
7 addresses heterogeneity from a classic antitrust perspective and section 8 addresses
heterogeneity from the perspective of a merger involving maverick firms. Section 9
contains robustness checks and section 10 concludes.
2.2 Maverick Firms and the U.S. Airline Industry
In the United States, the airline industry consists of two main groups of airlines, the
“legacy” carriers, so-called because they operated prior to deregulation, and the low
cost carriers. Legacy carriers offer a full menu of products to fliers, including various
fare classes (e.g. coach and first class), various sizes and types of aircraft, frequent
flier programs, and, typically, service through a hub-and-spoke network. Examples of
legacy carriers include Alaska, American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Republic,
US Airways, and United. In contrast, low-cost carriers usually offer a limited menu
of products to fliers, offer one fare class, and do not offer similarly comprehensive
frequent flier programs, or other perks. They typically fly one type of aircraft (which
are often newer and have lower running costs), often utilize secondary airports with
cheaper fees, and typically offer service through a point-to-point network. In a point-
to-point network, airlines operate service directly between two cities as opposed to
through a stopover hub. Low cost carriers typically operate this type of network and
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derive their relative efficiency from its lower cost structure.4 Examples of low cost
carriers include AirTran, Allegiant, Frontier, Jetblue, Southwest, Spirit, Sun Country,
and Virgin.
This structure of the airline industry is neatly described by the two-stage Hotelling
model outlined earlier with legacy firms acting as incumbents and low cost carriers
acting as entrants or mavericks. Before deregulation, airline service was federally
mandated to be a high price and high quality market. The legacy carriers thus
optimized their operations to serve the demands for these customers. Since price
competition was constrained, they competed on non-price factors, such as high quality
amenities and services. After deregulation, the low cost carriers found that there was
demand for cheaper flights with fewer amenities, locating below the legacy carriers
on the second period Hotelling line. However, because of fixed investments, legacy
carriers never transitioned into low cost carriers, choosing to serve the higher end,
more inelastic portion, of the market such as that for business travel. This closely
mirrors the industry we see today, decades after deregulation.
Within the maverick firm framework laid out by the Guidelines, the literature
on the airline industry implies that the low cost carriers, in particular Southwest,
may be identified as maverick firms within the U.S. airline industry. Section 2.1.5
indicates that mavericks may possess a disruptive technology or business model that
poses actual or potential competition to incumbents. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008)
examine the effect on prices from the threat of market entry and find that incumbent
carriers decrease fares when Southwest announces it will enter a market and Morrison
(2001) documents the consumer welfare gains due to competition from Southwest
airlines, indicating that Southwest may be a maverick under this qualification.
In 1993, the Department of Transportation noted that Southwest had a unique
effect on price and quality of service, over and above other low cost carriers, calling
it the Southwest Effect (Bennett and Craun, 1993). Many have found that the entry
or exit of a legacy carrier from a market has no effect on average fare price but
have found that when low cost carriers enter a market, fare prices decrease and when
they exit, fare prices increase (Bennett and Craun, 1996; Brueckner et al., 2013;
Hüschelrath and Müller, 2011; Ito and Lee, 2003; Kwoka et al., 2016; Morrison, 2001;
Moss, 2010; Tan, 2016). This literature indicates that not only Southwest, but low
cost carriers in general may fit the definition of maverick firms, as Section 2.1.5 points
out that mavericks may have incentives that lead them to be price cutters, aggressive
competitors, or resist industry price increases.
Section 2.1.5 also details that a maverick may possess the ability to quickly in-
crease production or may be a firm that resists industry norms or behaviors. South-
west and AirTran in particular may meet this criterion for defining a maverick. Kwoka
et al. (2016) noted that low cost carriers serve over one-fourth of all passengers and
capture a corresponding amount of revenue passenger miles and in many markets
Southwest and AirTran were the premerger largest and second largest low cost carri-
ers (Moss, 2010). Both firms also resist industry norms, for example, AirTran (along
4Ito and Lee (2003) note that two low cost carriers, Frontier and AirTran, operate hub-and-spoke
networks instead of point-to-point networks.
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with Frontier) chooses to operate hub-and-spoke networks instead of point-to-point
networks as a low cost carrier and Southwest is unique among firms in that you may
not view or buy their fares (and thus compare their fares) on travel websites.
Section 5.3 tells us that mavericks may be responsible for fluctuations in market
shares in highly concentrated markets. This aspect of “maverickness” is difficult to
detect in the airline industry using the quarterly data publicly available from the
Department of Transportation that most of the airline economics literature analyzes.
However, many markets in the airline industry are concentrated (the average market
in my dataset would be considered highly concentrated by the Department of Justice)
and Ito and Lee (2003) find that incumbent hub-and-spoke carriers accommodate low
cost carrier entrants to an extent by lowering fares. However, they do not find that
incumbents undercut the entrant’s prices or match the entrant’s capacity choices.
Finally, the Guidelines explicitly express in Section 10 that mergers may create
a new maverick firm or bestow an existing firm enhanced incentives to lower price
via cost reductions or realized efficiencies, decreasing the likelihood of coordination.
However, there is antitrust concern that a merger involving a maverick may have the
opposite effect, Kwoka et al. (2016) find that low cost carriers’ effect on both other low
cost carriers’ and legacy carriers’ prices weaken as their market share increases and
as one low cost carrier dominates a market, underscoring the possible competitive
importance of a merger involving two low cost carriers in that their market share
would increase in any market where they both competed and could lead to a decline
in competitive pressure.
The wealth of publicly available information has allowed an extensive economic
literature on the airline industry. In addition to the papers mentioned above, Boren-
stein (1990) analyzes two airline mergers and finds an increase in market power in one
but not the other. Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) look at the USAir/Piedmont merger
and find that prices rose on routes where one of the firms was present premerger and
the other was a potential entrant. Luo (2014) finds small fare increases due to the
Delta/Northwest merger. Brueckner et al. (2013) investigate the effect of in-market
and adjacent competition from low cost carriers and legacy carriers in nonstop and
connecting markets. They conclude that legacy carriers exert weak effects on average
fares while low cost carriers exert strong effects on average fares.5 By examining the
determinants of airfare for trips originating from specific airports instead of prices
at the airline-market level, Bilotkach and Lakew (2014) find that consumer welfare
losses from consolidation may be concentrated within smaller communities.
Du et al. (2008) examine the effect of the Southwest/American Trans Air code-
share agreements and find that prices decreased and the number of passengers served
increased for incumbents in affected markets, suggesting that Southwest has an effect
when it enters a route by code-share agreement in addition to entering it directly.
Lastly, Le (2016) assessed the Southwest/AirTran merger by investigating the price
and quantity changes on nonstop routes in different types of markets for the merging
5They define connecting markets as those in which neither low cost carriers nor legacy carriers
offer nonstop service. I define connecting service similarly, that is, connecting service is a flight
where there is a stopover between the two endpoints of the trip, also known as a multi-segment trip.
I include both nonstop and connecting service offered within the same market in my analysis.
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carriers.6 However, he does not control for market factors such as the effect of entry
and exit from low cost and legacy carriers and the possible influence of connecting
service. Neither does Le identify the market segments that drive the anticompeti-
tive effects of the merger. My research also differs from Le’s in that it contributes
to the general retrospective merger literature by using a difference-in-difference-in-
differences approach in retrospective merger analysis to analyze the effects that may
arise in a merger among maverick firms.
2.3 The Southwest/AirTran Merger
Since 2005, there have been four major airline mergers involving legacy carriers,
America West/US Airways (2005), Delta/Northwest (2008-2010), United/Continental
(2012), and US Airways/American Airlines (2013-2015). On September 27, 2010,
Southwest Airlines announced its intention to acquire AirTran Airways. On April
23, 2011, AirTran shareholders approved the merger and on April 26, 2011 it cleared
the U.S. Department of Justice without challenge. Southwest Airlines and AirTran
Airways were fully merged on December 28, 2014, when the last AirTran Airways
flight flew out of Atlanta, Georgia. The merger was unopposed by the antitrust
authorities because of the efficiencies the merger was expected to generate. The
Department of Justice cited both consumer welfare benefits from offering connecting
service to new cities through Atlanta (an AirTran hub) and a lack of barriers to entry
in markets where the two firms previously competed as justifications for approval
(DOJ, 2011).7 Additionally, Southwest’s fleet is comprised solely of Boeing 737s
and the AirTran fleet is comprised of 737s and 717s, so there was overlap in the two
carriers’ infrastructure.8 Southwest estimated that it would realize 400 million dollars
in annual synergies (Esterl, 2010).
Moss (2010) highlights several concerns regarding this merger. She identifies six
airport-pair markets in which the merger would create a monopoly, and twelve mar-
kets where the postmerger HHI would be above 5000.9 With no alteration of pricing
strategies, the postmerger company would be the lowest fare competitor on over half
of the top 1000 routes. This raises the prospect that the merger of the two firms
could potentially reduce competitive pressure on the airline industry as a whole.
On the face of it, a merger between Southwest and AirTran constitutes a Williamso-
nian tradeoff (Williamson, 1968). The cost savings go on one side of the ledger. But
the other side of the ledger deserves consideration as well. After all, the combination
of Southwest and AirTran represented a combination of two low cost carriers, which,
6Le defines four different types of routes by the type of competition Southwest and AirTran
engage in on the route. These include actual, potential, new, and non-overlap competition.
7Specifically, the Department of Justice said; “although there are overlaps on certain nonstop
routes, the division did not challenge the acquisition after considering the consumer benefits from
the new service. Also, the airports affected by the overlaps are not subject to restrictions on slots or
gate availability. Where such restrictions exist, entry by other airlines may be particularly difficult.”
8Southwest ended up selling the 717s to Delta to maintain a fleet of only one type of aircraft.
9If a city-pair market structure is used instead, these increases of HHI are not as notable, because
market shares tend to be lower in a city-pair market definition.
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as outlined above, typically act as maverick firms within a market. For Southwest,
the acquisition of AirTran represented the elimination of one of its main competitors
whose business model was like its own, not like that of a legacy carrier. Additionally,
either Southwest or AirTran typically offered the lowest fares in the majority of the
top 1000 markets as identified by Moss (2010). The elimination of head-to-head com-
petition between these firms could reduce pricing pressure on not only legacy carriers,
but also other low cost carriers as Kwoka et al. (2016) and Baker (2002) suggest.
Thus, with the merger of what are likely the largest and next largest maverick
firms in the U.S. airline industy, conditions are right for an increase in market power
for the new firm and collusion among remaining firms, even more so than in the case
of a merger of two legacy firms (Moss, 2010). This is the subject of this empirical
study.
2.4 Data and Variables
DB1B Market Database
Flight data were obtained from the DB1B database (specifically the DB1B Market
database), which is published by the US Department of Transportation. The DB1B
database is a quarterly sample of 10 percent of domestic airline tickets. One drawback
of the database is that, although it is a large sample compared to many other publicly
available databases, due to the random sampling nature of the data there may be
some smaller markets that are underrepresented and have a biased distribution of
tickets in the database. I deal with this in part by only looking at markets for
which both endpoint airports are located in a metropolitan statistical area. This may
underestimate my conclusions regarding the merger, given that Bilotkach and Lakew
(2014) found that smaller markets may be disproportionately affected by consolidation
and firm exit such as may occur as a result of a merger.
For each observation I am able to view the origin and destination airports and
the city and state where they are located, the price of the ticket, the number of con-
nections (and consequently whether it is a connecting or nonstop ticket), the airline
that sold the ticket, the airline that actually operated the flight, and the quarter
and year the flight occurred. I also am able to observe the number of passengers
who purchased a ticket at that price, whether or not it was a bulk fare, and various
distance metrics. I use the DB1B database to obtain the average fare on nonstop
and connecting flights for each carrier at the product level. I define a product as a
particular carrier offering a particular type of service in a specific market. For exam-
ple, Delta providing connecting service in the Chicago-Newark market and nonstop
service in the Chicago-Newark market would be considered two separate products. I
obtain per capita personal income at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level
from the Federal Reserve Economic Data that are made available by the St. Louis
Federal Reserve and population estimates at the MSA level from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis. I merge these macroeconomic variables with the MSA in which
the particular airport is located.
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Sample
In my analysis, I distinguish between nonstop and connecting service types.10 Most
of the literature on airline consolidation does not distinguish between nonstop and
connecting (multiple flight segments) service, or else considers them separately. Be-
cause it is a strong assumption that firms do not strategically react to the full menu
of alternatives when developing their pricing strategies, I incorporate data points cov-
ering both connecting and nonstop service in the same sample for my analysis. This
is done under the assumption that airlines take into account other carriers’ existing
nonstop and connecting services within a market when making strategic decisions,
e.g., how to price, how many seats to supply, whether to exit, or whether to enter. In
the sample I use for estimation I include major legacy and low cost carriers, resem-
bling analysis by Brueckner et al. (2013) and Luo (2014);11 However, I calculate HHIs
using all available data (including all airlines) in order to obtain accurate concentra-
tion estimates. Additionally, all markets are treated as directional. That is, the route
between Chicago and Washington D.C. and the route between Washington D.C. and
Chicago are treated as two separate markets.12 I create a panel from the first quarter
of 2009 through the last quarter of 2016. I omit data from the last quarter of 2010
and the first two quarters in 2011 because that is the time frame between when the
merger was announced by the firms and cleared by the Department of Justice.13 I also
estimate a model that includes this time period for robustness and find qualitatively
similar results. This provides a clean identification of the pricing strategies before
and after the merger was consummated. I do not omit very high or very low fares to
avoid econometrician-induced bias following Bollinger and Chandra (2005), though I
include a winsorized sample for robustness and find qualitatively similar results. I do,
however, omit fares sold in bulk to travel agents.14 Finally, I only include data from
carriers that service at least 2000 passengers on a particular route in the premerger
10I restrict my sample to flights with either zero or one connections.
11For low cost carriers these include AirTran (FL), Allegiant Air (G4), Frontier (F9), Jetblue (B6),
Southwest (WN), Spirit (NK), Sun Country (SY), and Virgin America (VX). For legacy carriers this
includes Alaska (AS), American (AA), Continental (CO), Delta (DL), Northwest (NW), Republic
(YX), US Airways (US) and United (UA).
12Due to carriers’ various network structures, it is sometimes the case that there will be emphasis
either on nonstop or connecting routes, as well as varying utilization rates throughout the day. For
instance, while there may be large amounts of traffic from City A to City B on Monday mornings for
commuters trying to make a meeting by nine o’clock, there may be less demand for specific flights
later in the day as different commuters fly back at different times. Carriers may attempt to increase
utilization rates for their aircraft by placing these passengers on connecting routes back to their
original city. I have also conducted my analysis at the city-pair level and found qualitatively similar
results.
13The merger was announced at the end of the third quarter of 2010, but I include data from this
quarter because only a very limited number of days may be affected. Given that very few consumers
purchase tickets right before a flight, it is unlikely that there was enough time for a significant
strategic response on the part of other carriers. I have a relatively short premerger window and my
analysis benefits from this increase in data points from this time period.
14I omit bulk fares sold to travel agents because they may be very different than the actual market
fares that clear the market for individuals.
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time period where both endpoints are in the continental United States.15
2.5 Standard Model
In keeping with the literature on merger retrospectives, I use difference-in-differences
as my main estimation approach (Bilotkach, 2011; Brueckner et al., 2013; Kwoka
et al., 2016; Tan, 2016). I estimate a fixed effects model at the product level because
I assume there will be differences in pricing strategies unique to each airline in each
directional airport-pair market for each type of service (nonstop and connecting). For
instance, United will likely price differently than American in the Chicago O’Hare-
Cincinnati CVG market as well as in the Chicago O’Hare-Houston Hobby market for
both nonstop and connecting service, due to idiosyncratic carrier specific costs and
network infrastructures. Using a fixed effects (within transformation) approach will
control for these product level effects that are known to the airlines but unobserved
by the econometrician.
The most critical assumption for difference-in-differences models is the parallel
trends assumption, which says that, but for the shock, the difference in outcomes
between treatment and control groups is constant over time. In order to motivate this,
I have plotted observed quarterly average fares comparing each of the six treatment
market types with the control market. Averages are weighted by passengers carried.
These are located in the Online Appendix in Figure A.1. Notice that after the merger
there is some level of divergence of trends. This generates evidence for the parallel
trends assumption and allows me to go forward with a difference-in-differences model,
outlined below. Identification is achieved on the assumption that, save for the merger,
there are no other shocks or contemporaneous effects postmerger that were not present
premerger which differentially affect markets where Southwest and AirTran offered
service premerger compared to those where it does not.
In keeping with the standard difference-in-difference approach for merger retro-
spectives, I define two comparison markets. The first, “treatment” markets, are
defined as a directional airport-pair where both of the merging firms offered either
or both nonstop and connecting service in every quarter of the premerger time pe-
riod. “Control” markets are defined as a directional airport-pair where neither of the
merging firms offered any type of service in any quarter of the premerger time period.
Note I use the language of treatment and control here, although these are not classic
treatment and control categories. I utilize this language in order to make clear that
the markets that should be affected by the merger are in the “treatment” group and
those markets that should not be affected by the merger are in the “control” group,
similar, though not the same, to quasi-experimental designs analyzing the effect of a
policy or intervention. In the data, this is captured by the variable Full SW and AT
Market, which takes a value of one if the market is a treatment market and a value
of zero if the market is a control market. These are so defined because if the merger
is of antitrust concern, it would likely be in those markets that experience a loss
15Due to the 10% sampling mechanism in the DB1B, I require each carrier to service at least 200
passengers on a route in the data.
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of a competitor and increase in concentration making tacit or overt collusion more
likely due to the merger. The merger should not affect markets where neither firm
competes because there should be no change in competition related to the merger
in these markets. In the data, I observe 482 of these markets, compared to 2,086
markets in my “control” group, as well as 1,560 markets where Southwest competed
premerger but AirTran did not and 572 markets where AirTran competed premerger
but Southwest did not.
If the specification and identification strategies are valid and the variable Post-
merger × Full SW and AT Market is positive and statistically significant, this is
evidence of anticompetitive effects from the merger on pricing decisions by firms
that compete in markets where Southwest competed premerger. I use cluster ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the market level. My full model has the following
specification:
log(priceijkt) = β1Postmergert + β2Full SW and AT Marketk+
β3Postmerger ∗ Full SW and AT Marketkt + β4Xijkt+
ηit + τt + αijk + εijkt (2.1)
I regress the log of the average market fare for carrier i offering service j in market
k at time t against the Postmergert dummy, the Full SW and AT Marketk variable,
their interaction term Postmerger ∗ Full SW and AT Marketkt, a vector of control
variables, Xijkt, which consists of market demographic and competition variables,
carrier-quarter fixed effects ηit, quarterly time fixed effects τt, and carrier-service-
market fixed effects αijk.
I estimate three separate specifications. Carrier, market, and service-type fixed
effects and interactions are included in all regressions. The first specification controls
for the interaction term Postmerger × Full SW and AT Market, Full SW and AT Mar-
ket, Postmerger, quarterly time effects (and thus Postmerger is not reported because
it is subsumed within these time effects) and quarter by carrier interactions to ac-
count for cost differences across time and carriers. The combination of Southwest and
AirTran represented a merger between two airlines with different network structures.
Southwest operated a point-to-point network whereas AirTran operated a hub-and-
spoke network. In a hub-and-spoke network, passengers often will go from point A to
point B through a centralized hub controlled by the airline instead of straight to their
destination, as in a point-to-point network. By including carrier-time fixed effects I
control for the costs of integrating these two different types of networks. The second
adds market demographic controls to the first specification: the geometric mean of
population at the route’s two endpoints (in 1,000,000’s of people), and the geometric
mean of per capita income at the route’s two endpoints (in 1000’s of dollars).
The third specification adds competition controls to the second specification. That
is, it adds dummy variable bins for the cases where there are one, two, or three (or
more) legacy carriers offering connecting service; one, two, or three (or more) legacy
carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three (or more) low cost carriers offering
connecting service; and one, two, or three (or more) low cost carriers offering nonstop
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service, twelve dummies in total.16 I include this last set of variables to capture
the amount of competition from low cost and legacy carriers. This is particularly
important due to the mergers of legacy airlines and the increase in competition from
other low cost carriers that occurred within the time frame of the panel. One would
expect that adding one carrier (legacy or low cost) may have less of a competitive effect
if there already are several carriers in the market than if there were only one or few
carriers in a market. The use of these dummy variables allows me to capture nonlinear
effects of additional entrants in the market. This follows the findings of Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991), who show that the effect of additional entry is nonlinear conditional on
the number of incumbent firms within a market, and that the procompetitive effects
of additional entry dissipate after a market has three to five incumbent firms.
There are three controls that would be desirable to include but are omitted due
to limitations of the dataset. The first is the date and time of specific flights. Unfor-
tunately, the DB1B only contains temporal information at the quarter level, though
it is well known that ticket prices fluctuate for different flights across the day and
across the days of the week. Additionally, as the flight approaches, airlines often
raise price in order to take advantage of the inelastic demand of business travelers,
however the DB1B contains no information when the ticket is sold relative to when
the flight occurs. Finally, it would be desirable to control for the “class” of the ticket,
first class tickets will sell at higher prices than business class tickets, which will sell
at higher prices than coach or economy class tickets. While the DB1B does contain
some information for class type, it is not reliable data and is rarely used within the
literature on airlines.
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for all variables in the premerger period are contained in Table 2.1
and summary statistics for all variables in the postmerger period are contained in
Table 2.2. Recall that each observation is an airfare product, that is, a carrier offering
either nonstop or connecting service in a directional airport-pair market in a particular
quarter. Comparing the premerger and postmerger time periods, there are some
noticeable differences relating to the extent of competition. The average number of
legacy carriers competing with connecting service falls from 4.53 to 3.32 while the
average number of low cost carriers competing with connecting service rises slightly
from .87 to .89, Figures 2.3 and 2.5 show the evolution of the number of markets
served by connecting service by legacy and low cost carriers over the sample period.
Similarly, the average number of competing legacy carriers offering nonstop service
falls from 1.85 to 1.50 while the average number of competing low cost carriers falls
from .45 to .42. Figures 2.2 and 2.4 show the evolution of the number of markets
16These will all take a value of zero when Southwest is the only carrier within a market. Because
of the Southwest Effect, I exclude Southwest from my tally of low cost carriers, since its effect on
competition has been documented to be distinct from that of the other low cost carriers, as mentioned
above. It is a valid approach to count low cost carriers separately from Southwest because the effect
from Southwest in a market has been shown to be distinct from that of other low cost carriers
(Bennett and Craun, 1993).
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served by nonstop service by legacy and low cost carriers over the sample period.
These numbers and graphs show the consolidation that has occurred over the sample
period due to merger and acquisition activity among the legacy carriers. Notice in
each case that the decline in the number of competing legacy carriers falls much more
both in absolute and relative terms than does the number of competing low cost
carriers. This highlights the need for the battery of competition variables I include
in my full model.
Selected summary statistics are also shown for products in markets neither South-
west nor AirTran competed in premerger (Table 2.3), and products in markets where
they both competed in the full premerger time period (Table 2.4). One thing to
note is that they differ in their relative concentration and level of competition, with
those markets that neither Southwest nor AirTran compete in having higher average
premerger HHI and significantly fewer competing legacy or low cost carriers, despite
higher populations.
Results
Across specifications, estimates from the interaction term for Post × Full SW and
AT Market imply that the increase in market power of the merged firm has allowed
airlines in markets both merging firms competed in before the merger to increase
prices between 5.27% and 6.10%. This is much more than the 1.1%-1.3% increase in
prices found by Luo (2014) in nonstop markets and 2.3% increase in prices in con-
necting markets due to the 2008 merger of Delta and Northwest, two non-maverick,
legacy carriers. In 2016 the Bureau of Transportation Statistics reports that South-
west enplaned over 150 million passengers (BTS, 2011). In the DB1B, I observe an
average fare of $161.37 for all tickets sold by Southwest in 2016. This implies a back-
of-the-envelope merger-related transfer of surplus of almost 1.3 billion dollars from
consumers to Southwest, more than three times the 400 million dollars in synergies
forecasted by the merging firms when announcing the acquisition.
Event Study
I further explore these results by conducting an event study using the same model
but with a reference period of Q4 2010. This is the first full quarter after the an-
nouncement of the merger and was chosen in order to account for the fact that once
the firms announced their intention to merge, strategic information may begin to be
shared between the two firms. Furthermore, despite it clearing the Department of
Justice in Q2 2011, there may have been anticipatory reactions by other firms directly
following the announcement but before the merger was cleared. The equation for the





γ−τQuarter−τ ∗ Full SW and AT Marketk+
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τ=1
δτQuarterτ ∗ Full SW and AT Marketk+
β2Full SW and AT Marketk + β3Xijkt+
ηit + τt + αijk + εijkt (2.2)
To corroborate the results from the standard diff-in-diff model, we expect that the
lead (γ) terms will be statistically indistinguishable from zero and the lag terms (δ)
will be positive and statistically significant. The event study is located in Figure 2.6
and seems to confirm the findings from the diff-in-diff model. There is (slightly
downward sloping) movement in price around zero in the lead terms up to the quarter
after the announcement of the merger as expected. Afterwards, the lag terms diverge
from zero three quarters after the merger (right after the DOJ cleared the merger), and
continue to rise throughout the postmerger time period, with expected fluctuations
around a positive trend.17
2.6 Addressing Selection
In order to identify merger-related effects on price, it is standard to compare markets
where both Southwest and AirTran competed premerger to those where neither com-
peted premerger. To do so the variable Full SW and AT Market was created which
takes a value of one for markets where both Southwest and AirTran competed in
the full premerger time period (every quarter) and a value of zero for markets where
neither competed in any quarter in the premerger time period. One drawback of this
approach is that there may be a selection issue in the sample of markets where both
competed in every quarter premerger. The concern is that there may be other mar-
kets that are affected by this merger that are not included in the “treatment” group.
To address this concern I also create a variable Any SW and AT Market which takes
a value of one for markets where both Southwest and AirTran competed at any point
(at least one quarter) in the premerger time period and a value of zero for markets
where neither competed in any quarter in my sample’s premerger time period. By
estimating separate regressions for each of these, I can be assured that my results are
robust to the endogenous selection that may be present in markets that Southwest
and AirTran competed in for the full premerger time period. Summary statistics for
the Full AT and SW Market sample are located in Table 2.4 and summary statis-
tics for the Any AT and SW Market sample are located in Table B.1 in the Online
Appendix. Overall, the selected summary statistics suggest these markets are similar.
17Though there appears to be some seasonality in the event study, time fixed effects are included
in the model, thus this appears to be some fluctuation in strategy and not solely due to some
recurring time trend.
17
Another source of selection bias may arise from only analyzing markets both firms
competed in during the premerger time period. As Rickert et al. (2018) point out,
a merger of two firms may affect not only markets where both firms compete in the
premerger time period, but also markets where only one of the firms competes in the
premerger time period. Endogenous selection issues may arise if these markets are
omitted from analysis since it is clear there are unobserved reasons why one but not
both firms chose to enter into this second type of market. While there are market
power-related issues to investigate in markets where both firms compete premerger,
issues relating to pass-through of efficiencies and the potential competitive influence
of the non-competing firm can be analyzed in markets where one but not both firms
compete.
I extend the methodology of Rickert et al. (2018) by analyzing non-overlap markets
for both the acquiring and the target firm. Markets that include both the acquiring
and target firm may experience distinct merger-related effects compared to markets
where the acquiring firm (Southwest) was present premerger and markets where the
target firm (AirTran) was present premerger. Specifically, in markets where Southwest
competed and AirTran did not compete we may observe effects related to the potential
competitive constraint AirTran may have imposed on Southwest or any efficiencies
Southwest may have implemented due to its acquisition of AirTran. In markets where
AirTran competed and Southwest did not we may observe any effects related to the
potential competitive constraint Southwest may have imposed on AirTran or any
efficiencies Southwest may have shared with AirTran. This is of special importance
given that Southwest and AirTran may be viewed as maverick firms in the U.S. airline
industry and may constrain collusive actions on the part of not only other firms, but
each other. To analyze this, I estimate an additional four regression equations using
four different treatment variables to the previous two defined above. The first two
are Full SW Market and Full AT Market. Full SW Market takes a value of one for
markets where Southwest is present in every quarter premerger but AirTran is not
present in any quarter premerger and Full AT Market takes a value of one for markets
where AirTran is present in every quarter premerger but Southwest is not present in
any quarter premerger. They both take a value of zero if neither firm is present
in any quarter premerger. As above, there is concern that this may be a selected
sample of markets. To alleviate this concern I also create the variables Any SW
Market and Any AT Market. Any SW Market takes a value of one for markets where
Southwest is present in at least one quarter premerger but AirTran is not present
in any quarter premerger. Any AT Market takes a value of one for markets where
AirTran is present in at least one quarter premerger but Southwest is not present in
any quarter premerger. They both take a value of zero for markets where neither firm
competes in the full premerger time period.
With this battery of regressions, it should be noted that each variable, while
designating a different treatment, designates the same control. For each sample, the
treatment markets are compared to markets where neither Southwest nor AirTran




Estimates are located in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.18 Table 2.6 contains results for Post ×
Full SW and AT Markets, Post × Full SW Markets, and Post × Full AT Markets.
As discussed above, results for Post × Full SW and AT Markets range between
5.27% and 6.10%, with the full specification implying a 5.27% average increase in
airfare due to the merger. Estimates for Post × Full SW Market range from 2.52%
to 3.56% and estimates for Post × Full AT Market range from 3.53% to 5.05%.
Respectively, the estimates from the preferred full specifications are 2.52% and 3.53%.
It should be noted that each type of market, whether containing both firms in the
premerger time period, the acquiring firm, or the target firm, experienced merger-
related price increases. The results for Post × Full SW and AT Market are the
largest in magnitude, as expected because of the decrease in concentration. While
firms may react strategically to the new merged firm in all of the markets in which
they compete, it is only markets that both Southwest and AirTran competed in that
experienced a merger-related increase in concentration. We would thus expect tacit
or overt collusion to be more likely in these markets than in those markets that did
not experience a merger-related firm exit.
It is interesting to note that the results from Post × Full AT Market were higher
specification-for-specification than those for Post × Full SW Market. Were these to
have been negative, it would be indicative of efficiencies implemented by Southwest
due to the acquisition of AirTran passed through to the consumer. That we see a
positive coefficient is not proof that efficiencies have not been realized, but instead
that the acquisition of AirTran has allowed firms to raise prices in markets that
Southwest competed but AirTran did not. This indicates that AirTran likely had an
effect on markets they had not yet entered through the threat of potential competition
and is an anticompetitive result of the merger, giving credence to the Guidelines’
concerns regarding mergers involving mavericks.
Theoretically, the regression on markets where AirTran was present in but South-
west was not is the most likely to have a null or negative result. The acquiring firm
often employs superior technology and/or processes compared to the target firm, re-
vealed by the fact it is the firm that is purchasing the other. If this is true, and
Southwest is indeed a more efficient firm than AirTran, these technologies should be
implemented at AirTran as it is absorbed into the new company. That these markets
observe increases in average airfare, taken with the results from the other two market
types, indicates that both of these firms may be considered mavericks, and that the
merger appears to have weakened their “maverickness”. Undoubtedly, price increases
in Southwest-only markets points to a weakening of its maverick effect, but the larger
relative price increases in AirTran markets points to a larger weakening of AirTran’s
maverick effect.
Next I analyze how merger-related price effects may differ if I relax the stringent
requirement for a comparison market to experience competition from one or both of
the merging firms for all quarters of the premerger time period. A market entered
18Full results for variables omitted from tables can be made available by request to the author.
It should be stated that in general all control variables were of the expected sign.
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by both firms the quarter before the merger may be just as affected by the merger as
markets where they have been competing with each other for every quarter premerger.
Not only that, but markets both firms enter seasonally to meet fluctuating demand
may also be affected by the merger. Table 2.7 contains estimates for Post × Any SW
and AT Markets, Post × Any SW Markets, and Post × Any AT Markets. Estimates
for Post × Any SW and AT Markets range from 4.81% to 5.61% with the preferred
full specification implying a 4.81% merger-related average increase in price. Estimates
for Post × Any SW Markets and Post × Any AT Markets are similar in magnitude
and smaller than those for Post × Any SW and AT Markets, ranging from 2.11% to
3.15% and 2.19% to 3.57%. The lower bounds of both estimates are from the preferred
full specification. It is reassuring in terms of model specification that although lower
in magnitude than the “full” market variables, estimates are positive, statistically
significant, and close in magnitude across specifications and variable definitions. This
acts as a robustness test towards alleviating concern about specification bias with
regards to the standard model, as well as adding information as to how the merger
may have had heterogeneous effects across different types of markets the merging firm
competed in. This motivates a heterogeneity analysis of the merger across different
types of markets from a classic antitrust perspective, and different types of firms from
a “maverick merger” perspective.
2.7 Addressing Heterogeneity from a Classic Antitrust Perspective
Difference-in-Differences Estimates, Concentration Subsamples
In general, industrial organization theory and antitrust experience show that firm
conduct may differ markedly in more concentrated markets, though exceptions also
have been documented. Where concentration is higher, market conditions may induce
firms to be more likely to engage in tacit or overt collusion. To address this I conduct
a subsample analysis across market concentration levels, because the merger may have
had different effects in highly concentrated markets compared to unconcentrated mar-
kets. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines consider markets with an HHI above 2500
to be highly concentrated and mergers that result in an HHI in this range accom-
panied by at least a 100 point increase in concentration pose “potentially significant
competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny,” while mergers in unconcentrated
markets, “are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require no
further analysis.” For this reason, I investigate heterogeneous effects of the merger
across markets that the Agencies may consider unconcentrated versus those it would
consider concentrated through subsample analysis. The merging firms and their com-
petitors may react strategically to the merger in different ways in these different types
of markets. Recall a market is defined as a directional airport pair. I calculate the
premerger HHI for each market using each airline’s share of passengers between a
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directional airport-pair to measure firm market shares.19,20 This approach has the
benefit of aligning with the thresholds considered by the Agencies to be concentrated
and unconcentrated (above and below an HHI of 2500).
Given the similarity of results between the treatment variables defining treatment
as being present for the entire premerger time period versus requiring presence in
a market for at least one quarter, I utilize the more standard treatment variables
Full SW and AT Market, Full SW Market, and Full AT Market for this analysis.
Table 2.8 contains results. Only in the sample of markets that would be considered
concentrated by the Agencies are estimates positive and statistically significant. For
the subsample of concentrated markets, the highest estimate is for the coefficient of
Post × Full SW and AT Market (4.70%) and lowest for the coefficient of Post ×
Full SW Market (2.87%), similar to those found in analysis of the full pooled sample.
In unconcentrated markets, estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero or
statistically negative in the case of Post × Full SW Market (-7.16%). This may
indicate that the previous results are being driven by merger-related effects observed
in concentrated markets. One thing to note is that many of the markets in the
data, and many airport-pair markets in general, are concentrated. I observe 25,790
airline products in markets that would be considered unconcentrated or moderately
concentrated by the agencies but 237,603 airline products in markets that would
be considered highly concentrated by the DOJ and FTC. This confirms the fears
expressed by Moss (2010) and indicates that entry may not have restricted merger-
related effects as predicted by the Agencies in these very concentrated markets. These
results are as antitrust experience and theory would expect and motivate part of the
triple-difference approach I describe below. That the empirical findings corroborate
theory lends credence to the model and this methodological approach.
Triple Difference Estimates: Concentration Differences
In addition to a difference-in-differences approach I also use a difference-in-difference-
in-differences (triple difference) approach to analyze the merger. Using a triple differ-
ence has many benefits over the well-known difference-in-differences approach. First,
it allows the economist to investigate the heterogeneous effects of a program or shock.
For instance, (Courtemanche et al., 2017) note that the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
may have had a greater impact in states that had a larger uninsured rate prior to the
ACA than those states that had a lower rate. To account for this they implement a
triple difference by interacting states’ pre-ACA uninsured rate with a post-ACA time
dummy and a dummy for states that implemented the ACA.
Second, a key econometric benefit of the triple-difference approach is the less
restrictive assumption necessary for identification in this approach compared to a
difference-in-differences approach. Whereas one must assume that there are not dif-
19Market share is defined as the sum of connecting and nonstop tickets sold within a market for
a specific carrier
20Due to the sampling mechanism of the DB1B there may be measurement error in this variable.
The DB1B only reports 10% of airfares and thus may understate or overstate the actual share of
market used to calculate HHI.
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ferential changes between treatment and control save for that caused by the merger
in a difference-in-differences approach, in a triple-difference approach one must only
assume that any differential changes that may have occurred in treatment and control
markets were not correlated with the third difference. This is a weaker assumption
than is necessary for identification in a difference-in-differences setup. The parallel
trends assumption for the triple difference models I analyze are shown in Figures A.2
and A.3 in the Online Appendix. For more details on the triple difference approach,
the author refers readers to Courtemanche et al. (2017).
A natural triple difference of interest to the Agencies is one where the third differ-
ence is along concentrated and unconcentrated markets as defined by the Agencies.
That is, concentrated markets are those that have a premerger HHI above 2500 and
unconcentrated markets are those that have a premerger HHI below 2500. This model
takes the following form:
log(priceijkt) = β1Postmergert + β2Treatmentk+
β3Concentrationk + β4Postmerger ∗ Treatmentkt+
β5Postmerger ∗ Concentrationkt + β6Concentration ∗ Treatmentk+
β6Postmerger ∗ Concentration ∗ Treatmentkt+
β4Xijkt + ηit + τt + αijk + εijkt (2.3)
As above, given the similarity of results between the treatment variables defining
treatment as being present for the entire premerger time period versus requiring
presence in a market for at least one quarter, I utilize the more standard treatment
variables Full SW and AT Market, Full SW Market, and Full AT Market for this
analysis. Results are in Tables 2.9. For robustness I provide results for regressions that
include Any SW and AT Market, Any SW Market, and Any AT Market in Table C.1
in the Online Appendix. Results are broadly consistent regardless whether treatment
is composed of markets where Southwest and AirTran, Southwest, or AirTran were
present for the full premerger time period or at any point.
I find positive and statistically significant estimates for Post × Full SW and AT
Market × Concentrated and Post × Full SW Market × Concentrated, however I
find a statistically insignificant (though positive) estimate for Post × Full AT Mar-
ket × Concentrated. This implies that there were merger-related price increases in
concentrated markets compared to unconcentrated markets. The full effect of the
merger across all markets is captured in the double interaction term. I again estimate
coefficients statistically indistinguishable from zero as in the subsample analysis of
unconcentrated markets for these double interaction terms, except for Post × Full
SW Market, which I estimate to be negative but smaller in magnitude than the result
from the subsample analysis (-5.88% versus -7.16%). This confirms the findings from
the subsample analysis, but urges caution regarding the previous results for markets
that AirTran competed in that Southwest did not.
A triple difference may be used as an approach in the antitrust economist’s tool-
box when looking at, identifying, and assessing merger remedies in future analyses.
This is especially important given the recent interest by the Agencies in the increased
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application of merger remedies and skepticism towards behavioral fixes.21 A more
flexible dummy variable approach for a third difference along concentration can re-
veal merger-related effects at a more granular level. For instance, instead of simply
differencing across whether a market is concentrated or unconcentrated, one could
create a flexible approach using four dummy variable bins that take a value of one
when the market HHI is between 0 and 2500, 2501 and 5000, 5001 and 7500, and
7501 and 10,000 respectively. The bins chosen could vary. These four were chosen
in order to have more evenly spaced and easily interpreted, intervals, with one in-
terval that captures the entire range of HHI for which a market may be considered
unconcentrated, for clarity in showing this practical application. (The base case for
estimation will be the 0-2500 bin.)
The advantage of this model is the ability to identify and reveal what is happen-
ing across different market types across time, across markets related to the merger,
and across a market characteristic that may be differentially affected by the merger.
Table 2.10 contains results for Full SW and AT Market, Full SW Market, and Full
AT Market. Again, results are consistent regardless whether treatment is composed
of markets where Southwest and AirTran, Southwest, or AirTran were present for the
full premerger time period or at any point.22 The estimate for Post × Full SW and
AT Market is negative but statistically indifferent from zero, as above. However, for
the triple difference in this regression, the estimates become positive, statistically sig-
nificant, and rise in magnitude with concentration level, indicating a merger-related
increase in airfare of 4.76% for Post × Full SW and AT Market × HHI: 2501-5000,
a merger related increase in airfare of 6.46% for Post × Full SW and AT Market ×
HHI: 5001-7500, and a merger related increase in airfare of 5.54% for Post × Full
SW and AT Market × HHI: 7501-10,000.
Analyzing markets Southwest competed in premerger but AirTran did not, I find
a large, negative, and significant coefficient Post × Full SW Market of -5.85%, indi-
cating a procompetitive merger-related impact on these markets. This would indicate
that the merger may have had the potential to create a “stronger” maverick by sharing
technologies or processes between the firms. However, as concentration rises, the signs
on the triple interactions become large and positive, even compared to those markets
both firms competed in premerger. The estimate for Post × Full SW Market × HHI:
2501-5000 implies merger-related price increases of 5.97%, consistent with the upper
bound of estimates from previous analysis. However, the estimate for Post × Full
SW Market × HHI: 5001-7500 implies merger-related price increases of 9.82% and
Post × Full SW Market × HHI: 7501-10,000 implies merger-related price increases
of 12.3%, roughly ten times the merger related price increase Luo (2014) estimated
21One particularly clear example of this came during Assistant Attorney General Delrahim’s 2017
speech to the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Fall Forum, when he said, “I believe the Division
should fairly review offers to settle but also be skeptical of those consisting of behavioral remedies or
divestitures that only partially remedy the likely harm. We should settle federal antitrust violations
only where we have a high degree of confidence that the remedy does not usurp regulatory functions
for law enforcement, and fully protects American consumers and the competitive process.”
22Results for Any SW and AT Market, Any SW Market, and Any AT Market are located in the
Online Appendix in Table C.2.
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for the merger between the non-maverick airlines Delta and Northwest.
If the results for markets Southwest competed in but AirTran did not present
cause for concern, the opposite seems to be true for those markets AirTran competed
in, but Southwest did not. For the triple interactions of markets with HHI less than
7500, I find coefficients statistically indistinguishable from zero and while positive,
are smaller in magnitude compared to other estimates. While in very concentrated
markets (those with HHI above 7500) I do find merger-related price increases of
4.82%, it is smaller in magnitude than either the estimate for Post × Full SW Market
× HHI: 7501-10,000 or Post × Full SW and AT Market × HHI: 7501-10,000. This
seems to indicate that the firm’s and their competitors’ incentives did not change
postmerger in these markets to the extent they did in markets both firms or Southwest
competed in. It also seems to indicate that perhaps the potential threat of AirTran
affected Southwest’s conduct to a greater degree than the potential threat of entry
by Southwest posed to AirTran. This is an unexpected but interesting result for both
the literature on airlines and the literature on maverick firms. To this second point,
it appears to lend credence to the fear that firms, in this case even another maverick
firm, may purchase mavericks to alleviate the competitive pressure they exert.
2.8 Addressing Heterogeneity from A Maverick Perspective
Difference-in-Differences Estimates, Carrier Type Subsamples
Because the merger of two mavericks may affect maverick firms and non-maverick
firms differently, I apply a difference-in-differences approach on subsamples across the
two carrier types because the airline industry’s natural delineation between low cost
carriers and legacy carriers maps well to definitions of mavericks and non-mavericks,
respectively. Low cost carriers and legacy carriers have distinct differences in how they
are organized, how they conduct themselves, and how they react to changing market
conditions. The literature also has demonstrated that low cost carriers and legacy
carriers have different competitive effects on each other, as mentioned above in the
literature review. Results for this subsample analysis are located in Table 2.11. This
also motivates a separate maverick firm-specific triple-difference approach I implement
below. Again, given the similarity of results between the treatment variables defining
treatment as being present for the entire premerger time period versus requiring
presence in a market for at least one quarter, I utilize the more standard treatment
variables Full SW and AT Market, Full SW Market, and Full AT Market for this
analysis.23 For this subsample analysis I drop observations of Southwest and AirTran
to fully investigate the impact on the different types of firms they compete with and
their responses to the merger.
For the subsamples containing only legacy carriers’ products I find positive and
statistically significant results for each regression, with the highest estimate coming
from the regression on Post × Full SW and AT Market which implies an average
merger-related price increase of 5.03%. This indicates that the loss of competition
23As above, results for Any SW and AT Market, Any SW Market, and Any AT Market are located
in the Online Appendix in Table C.3.
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between Southwest and AirTran has allowed legacy carriers (non-mavericks) to raise
price. Results are smaller in magnitude for Post × Full SW Market (2.79%) and Post
× Full AT Market (3.65%). However, as before, there is evidence that an independent
AirTran may have been playing relatively more of a maverick role than Southwest,
in that legacy carriers raised prices more postmerger in markets where AirTran was
a competitor than in markets Southwest was a competitor.
Interestingly, among the low cost carrier subsamples, only the estimate for Post ×
Full SW and AT Market is statistically distinguishable from zero. It is positive and
statistically significant and implies a 6.76% merger-related increase in airfare among
low cost carriers in markets that both firms served premerger. This is large compared
to other results I find. It is also interesting that the estimate for Post × Full SW
Market is negative, but both it and the estimate for Post × Full AT Market have
large standards errors and are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
This is a situation discussed in Baker (2002) and found in the results of Kwoka
et al. (2016), which as discussed above, finds that low cost carriers constrain both the
prices of legacy carriers and other low cost carriers though their ability to constrain
prices dissipates as its market share increases. These findings corroborate their con-
clusions. The market share of Southwest would necessarily increase in markets where
AirTran also competed, and as the increase in price shows, demonstrates a weakening
of Southwest’s “maverickness” - both towards non-mavericks (legacy carriers) and
other maverick firms (low cost carriers). It also reveals that low cost carriers are
competitive relative to each other differently than they are relative to legacy carriers
and that the loss of competition in a merger involving two mavericks may impact
other mavericks to a larger extent than non-maverick firms in markets where both
firms competed premerger. It is interesting that there were significant results for
Post × Full SW Market and Post × Full AT Market for the legacy sample but not
the low cost carrier sample. This provides evidence non-mavericks react to the new
maverick in different ways than other maverick firms when there is no actual loss
of competition due to merger-related firm exit. These are novel findings and merit
further exploration.
Triple Difference Estimates: Carrier Differences
The triple difference outlined earlier can be modified to accommodate analysis of
maverick firms. As Baker (2002) illustrates and the subsample analysis suggests, a
merger involving a maverick firm may change the incentives of other mavericks or
change the incentives of the merging mavericks to the benefit of its non-maverick
competitors. That these effects may be present is of interest and possible concern to
antitrust practitioners. This leads to a third difference across firm type (maverick vs
non-maverick) that we may wish to investigate in mergers involving maverick firms.
The use of a triple difference instead of subsample analysis also has advantages
from the perspective of efficiency due to the larger sample size in addition to the
increase in information the approach reveals to us as well as the weaker assumptions
for identification as mentioned above. This approach can be generalized to other
analyses involving a merger between mavericks by denoting the third difference as to
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whether a firm is a maverick or non-maverick. Because there is agreement as to which
firms are legacy carriers and which are low cost carriers, and non-maverick firms can be
mapped to legacy carriers while maverick firms can be mapped to low cost carriers, the
airline industry is a convenient choice to demonstrate this methodological approach.
Interacting a dummy variable indicating whether or not a carrier is a maverick firm
(low cost carriers) may reveal whether this merger affected other maverick firms (low
cost carriers) differently than non-mavericks (legacy carriers). Such a model would
take the following form, with the dummy Maverick denoting whether or not the firm
is a maverick firm:
log(priceijkt) = β1Postmergert + β2Treatmentk+
β3Mavericki + β4Postmerger ∗ Treatmentkt+
β5Postmerger ∗Maverickit + β6Maverick ∗ Treatmentik+
β6Postmerger ∗Maverick ∗ Treatmentikt+
β4Xijkt + ηit + τt + αijk + εijkt (2.4)
Table 2.12 contains estimates for this triple difference.24 For this analysis I drop
observations of Southwest and AirTran to isolate the effect of the merger solely on
mavericks and non-mavericks not involved in the merger.
Looking at the full merger effect (Post × Full SW and AT Market) I find a merger-
related price increase of 4.99%. This is the effect of the merger on both legacy and
low cost carriers. The effect of the merger on maverick firms is identified by Post ×
Full SW and AT Market × Maverick and is positive but not statistically significant.
This is weak evidence that low cost carriers were able to raise prices to a larger degree
than legacy carriers due to the merger, confirming the findings from the subsample
analysis.
Looking at the full merger effect in markets where Southwest competed premerger
but AirTran did not, I estimate a merger-related price increase of 2.81% for Post ×
Full SW Market and a statistically significant merger-related price decrease of -5.07%
for Post × Full SW Market × Maverick, indicating an increase in competition among
low cost carriers in these markets. Looking at markets AirTran competed premerger
but Southwest did not I find a similar increase of 3.55% in prices for Post × Full
AT Market and my estimate for Post × Full AT Market × Maverick is negative
but statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results indicate that mavericks
and non-mavericks may indeed react differently to a merger among mavericks. The
findings that maverick firms in the acquiring firm’s markets seem to enhance their
maverickness given this merger is interesting and may indicate that the new firm
may be an enhanced or stronger maverick in some markets, though it is also clear
that it appears to have lost its competitive significance in those markets where both
competed premerger.
Taken together, these estimates indicate that it is only in some types of markets
that the merger may have had an anticompetitive effect and that it affected different
24For analysis of the treatment variables, Any SW and AT Market, Any SW Market, or Any AT
Market please see Table C.4 in the Online Appendix
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firms with different intensity levels. These are results that may not have arisen
out of subsample analysis alone and would not have been identified using a typical
difference-in-differences approach. These models also outline possible ways in which
triple-differences may be used in future merger retrospectives and particularly in
future merger retrospectives involving maverick firms.
2.9 Robustness checks
Investigating Mechanisms
One concern about the standard model is that it may not capture merger-related in-
creases or decreases in price due to changes in marginal cost. By including carrier-time
fixed effects in the model I may be overcontrolling for these as well as merger-related
inefficiences related to the integration of the two firms. To address this I estimate
a model where I drop carrier-time fixed effects and only include time-invariant fixed
effects. Results are located in the Online Appendix in Table C.5. Estimates for Post
× Full SW and AT Market and Post × Full AT Market are consistent with the full
specification, positive, and statistically significant. The estimate for Post × Full SW
Market remains positive but is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is in-
dicative of merger-related changes in marginal costs not being the sole mechanism
through which prices are affected postmerger.
Dropping Data from Merging Firms
By including data from Southwest and AirTran in the full pooled sample, there is a
risk that the increase in price could be due to unilateral effects from the merger, that
is, the increase in price could be due to strategic price increases only on the part of
the merged firm. To alleviate this concern, I run the full model on a sample that
includes all legacy and low cost carriers except for Southwest and AirTran. Results
are located in the Online Appendix in Table C.6. Estimates are positive, statistically
significant, and similar in magnitude to those of the full sample, regardless of which
treatment variable is used. This indicates that the merger-related price increases are
likely not due solely to unilateral effects.
Sensitivity to Excluding Data During the Merger
Another concern with this analysis may be that there was some shock in the data
that was dropped from the sample. Conceivably, the effects observed in this analysis
are not in fact due to the merger but due to some event that occurred during the
period between the announcement and clearing of the merger that caused the firms
to change their strategy in a way that looks like it was caused by the merger. To
assuage these concerns, I re-estimate my results and include the time period between
the announcement and close of the merger in the premerger time period. Results are
in Table C.7 in the Online Appendix and are consistent with those of the full sample
that excludes these periods but of a slightly smaller magnitude. Compared to the
estimates from the sample that exclude the time period between the announcement
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and close of the merger, these may be conservative because firms may change their
conduct in anticipation of the merger.
Weighted Regression
One might also be concerned that observations for small providers on small routes are
given the same weight as those for large providers on large routes. That is, Delta’s
Chicago-New York nonstop route is given the same weight as Frontier’s nonstop
route between Denver and Cincinnati. I thus re-estimate my models using a weighted
regression approach, weighting by the passengers flown by the carrier on a route within
a quarter. Results are located in Table C.8 in the Online Appendix and estimates on
the coefficient of interest are smaller in magnitude than those in the full sample, but
still generally positive and statistically significant.25
Winsorized Sample
Since I do not drop data below or above any cutoff following the suggestions and find-
ings of Bollinger and Chandra (2005), one concern may be the influence of outliers
that are erroneous data inputs or highly unusual, one-off ticket sales. To amelio-
rate these concerns I analyze a sample of the data winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Results are located in Table C.9 in the Online Appendix and are qual-
itatively similar to results from the full non-winsorized sample, with estimates on
the interaction term ranging between 2.11% and 5.27% depending on the treatment
variable, providing confidence that these findings are not due to outliers.
2.10 Conclusion
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines accord special scrutiny to mergers that involve
maverick firms. The loss of a maverick or the alteration of its incentives may lead to
anticompetive merger-related price increases or changes in quality. After identifying
how low cost carriers could be considered mavericks within the U.S. airline industry,
I analyze how the merger of two such firms has affected prices in markets where both
competed premerger, as well as markets where one of the merged firms competed
premerger. I find heterogeneous and large anticompetitive merger-related price in-
creases. These findings are robust to selection bias in how treated markets are defined
and are driven by price-increases in concentrated markets, which make up the bulk
of airport-pair markets in the U.S.
These findings also suggest that the different types of airlines in the U.S. have
likely been affected by the merger differently, consistent with theories of how mav-
erick firms and non-maverick firms are likely to respond to a merger between two
mavericks. There is also evidence that acquisition activity could occur in order to
take a more aggressive maverick out of the market. As acquisition activity increases,
25There is concern regarding the estimates for Post × Full AT Market and Post × Any AT
Market as these are statistically significant and negative, this merits more investigation.
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especially among firms that may not fall under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act’s report-
ing requirements, some markets may experience real losses in competition due to the
elimination of a maverick firm. However, this fact should also be tempered with the
realization that innovation, entrepreneurism, and firm entry is likely to be as robust
as it is in this country because of the prospect of being acquired at a premium by a
larger firm.
This analysis has confirmed the Guidelines’ concerns regarding the competitive
impacts of merger involving maverick firms compared to those involving non-maverick
firms. However, more research needs to be done, acquisitions of maverick firms in
other industries may result in stronger, more aggressive mavericks. Additionally,
acquisitions of maverick firms by non-mavericks may affect competitors differently
than acquisitions of maverick firms by other maverick firms, as in this study. This
and other questions are left for future research.
2.11 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics Premerger (product level)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 169.9465 65.04362 32.37294 3613.837
HHI 4888.717 2396.818 1132.455 10000
Southwest Market .5323549 .4827092 0 1
AirTran Market .3897323 .4685111 0 1
Southwest or AirTran Market .4734696 .4650957 0 1
Origin City Population 4291926 4444117 60464 1.96e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 42320.19 7150.42 21171 70564
Destination City Population 4297920 4447784 60464 1.96e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 42350.19 7149.265 21171 70564
Southwest and AirTran Market .2243088 .3930893 0 1
Market Size 17369.61 19471.5 213 163252
Monopoly Route .0199636 .1398766 0 1
Carrier Passengers 6581.786 7735.653 8 68295
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 4.529978 2.048461 0 8
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers .8703025 .969515 0 6
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 1.845447 1.545744 0 8
Number of Nonstop LCC Carriers .4517693 .6389593 0 3
One Connecting Legacy Carrier .0632911 .2434885 0 1
Two Connecting Legacy Carriers .0855143 .2796486 0 1
Three or more Connecting Legacy Carriers .7978632 .4015981 0 1
One Connecting LCC Carrier .3347301 .4719012 0 1
Two Connecting LCC Carriers .1742755 .3793504 0 1
Three or more Connecting LCC Carriers .0547134 .2274224 0 1
One Nonstop Legacy Carrier .2312046 .4216076 0 1
Two Nonstop Legacy Carriers .2404625 .427369 0 1
Three or more Nonstop Legacy Carriers .2980716 .4574161 0 1
One Nonstop LCC Carrier .3098743 .4624467 0 1
Two Nonstop LCC Carriers .0616019 .2404337 0 1
Three or more Nonstop LCC Carriers .0062304 .0786874 0 1
Observations 45583
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics Postmerger (product level)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 205.5957 61.15266 26.70188 666.0576
HHI 4742.085 2405.932 1132.455 10000
Southwest Market .5424056 .4803943 0 1
AirTran Market .3904097 .4676611 0 1
Southwest or AirTran Market .4583294 .46136 0 1
Origin City Population 4587658 4633633 61354 2.02e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 49580.58 9723.983 22411 118295
Destination City Population 4589806 4639707 61354 2.02e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 49614.13 9744.931 22411 118295
Southwest and AirTran Market .237243 .3999152 0 1
Market Size 17033.59 19565.68 205 163252
Monopoly Route .0194353 .1380496 0 1
Carrier Passengers 5493.714 7672.112 1 68295
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 3.320916 1.338865 0 6
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers .8945251 1.091627 0 6
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 1.501965 1.250543 0 6
Number of Nonstop LCC Carriers .4220014 .6406797 0 4
One Connecting Legacy Carrier .0764744 .2657566 0 1
Two Connecting Legacy Carriers .0749502 .2633119 0 1
Three or more Connecting Legacy Carriers .7953434 .4034518 0 1
One Connecting LCC Carrier .292593 .4549547 0 1
Two Connecting LCC Carriers .1510724 .3581206 0 1
Three or more Connecting LCC Carriers .0858364 .2801233 0 1
One Nonstop Legacy Carrier .2988931 .4577744 0 1
Two Nonstop Legacy Carriers .2473479 .4314721 0 1
Three or more Nonstop Legacy Carriers .2059098 .4043663 0 1
One Nonstop LCC Carrier .277832 .4479316 0 1
Two Nonstop LCC Carriers .0614491 .2401532 0 1
Three or more Nonstop LCC Carriers .0069978 .0833599 0 1
Observations 147618
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics (products in markets neither AirTran nor Southwest
competed in premerger)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 180.0307 84.58785 32.37294 3613.837
HHI 6177.783 2408.497 1418.017 10000
Origin City Population 5193446 5476564 60464 1.96e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 42198.45 7137.693 21171 70564
Destination City Population 5191458 5487689 60464 1.96e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 42215.12 7145.659 21171 70564
Market Size 13943.63 22603.49 213 163252
Carrier Passengers 5959.722 7740.707 70 62560
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 3.595728 2.128453 0 8
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers .3292644 .6015812 0 3
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 1.865644 1.480368 0 7
Number of Nonstop LCC Carriers .3095085 .5035537 0 2
Observations 12452
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics (products in markets both firms competed in every
quarter premerger)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 166.3803 43.49036 65.05872 398.1082
HHI 3471.516 1592.252 1247.39 9578.104
Origin City Population 3773307 2904350 612297 1.28e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 41565.97 6351.282 32240 60771
Destination City Population 3804705 2922204 612297 1.28e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 41650.34 6386.31 32240 60771
Market Size 21442.49 15169.09 1656 90569
Carrier Passengers 6492.196 6369.456 136 38362
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 5.661661 1.300054 1 8
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers 1.81182 .8742155 0 5
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 2.008679 1.500641 0 7
Number of Nonstop LCC Carriers .7111172 .6909657 0 3
Observations 7259
Table 2.5: Regression Results: Difference-in-Differences Fixed Effects Model, Full
Sample, Southwest and AirTran Market Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Post × Full SW and AT Market 0.0596∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0527∗∗∗
(0.00811) (0.00804) (0.00793)
Observations 84661 84661 84661
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.366 0.373
Time Effects? Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions? Y Y Y
Market Demographics? N Y Y
Competition Variables? N N Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare
products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would
have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the
quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and
geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that
indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one,
two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall
that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table 2.6: Fixed Effects Model, Full Sample (Dependent variable = Log Average Fare)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post × Full SW and AT Market 0.0596∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0527∗∗∗
(0.00811) (0.00804) (0.00793)
Post × Full SW Market 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗ 0.0252∗
(0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0103)
Post × Full AT Market 0.0393∗∗∗ 0.0505∗∗∗ 0.0353∗∗∗
(0.00839) (0.00819) (0.00796)
Observations 84661 84661 84661 104923 104923 104923 73809 73809 73809
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.366 0.373 0.333 0.337 0.349 0.339 0.343 0.354
Time Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Market Demographics? N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Competition Variables? N N Y N N Y N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare products that transported at least 200 passengers in
the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the
quarter level. Market demographics variables include arithmetic mean of route endpoints’ population, and arithmetic mean of route endpoints’ per capita income.
Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one,
two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or
more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table 2.7: Fixed Effects Model, Full Sample (Dependent variable = Log Average Fare)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post × Any SW and AT Market 0.0547∗∗∗ 0.0561∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗
(0.00691) (0.00683) (0.00679)
Post × Any SW Market 0.0315∗∗ 0.0271∗∗ 0.0211∗
(0.00995) (0.00990) (0.00983)
Post × Any AT Market 0.0263∗∗∗ 0.0357∗∗∗ 0.0219∗∗
(0.00794) (0.00782) (0.00769)
Observations 105601 105601 105601 109727 109727 109727 83488 83488 83488
Adjusted R2 0.379 0.381 0.388 0.331 0.335 0.348 0.339 0.342 0.354
Time Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Market Demographics? N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Competition Variables? N N Y N N Y N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare products that transported at least 200 passengers in
the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the
quarter level. Market demographics variables include arithmetic mean of route endpoints’ population, and arithmetic mean of route endpoints’ per capita income.
Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one,
two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or
more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table 2.8: Regression Results: Difference-in-Differences Fixed Effects Model, Con-
centrated vs Unconcentrated Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Full SW and AT Market -0.0238 0.0470∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.00930)
Post × Full SW Market -0.0716∗∗∗ 0.0287∗
(0.0156) (0.0118)
Post × Full AT Market -0.0156 0.0343∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.00819)
Observations 11473 73188 9695 95228 4622 69187
Adjusted R2 0.618 0.352 0.582 0.340 0.634 0.349
HHI Threshold < 2500 > 2500 < 2500 > 2500 < 2500 > 2500
Time Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Market Demographics? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Competition Variables? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare
products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would
have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the
quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and
geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that
indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one,
two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall
that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table 2.9: Regression Results: Triple Difference Fixed Effects Model Across Concen-
trated and Unconcentrated Markets
1 2 3
Post × Concentrated -0.0919∗∗∗ -0.0955∗∗∗ -0.0899∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0130) (0.0126)
Post × Full SW and AT Market -0.0186
(0.0133)
Post × Full SW and AT Market × Concentrated 0.0666∗∗∗
(0.0147)
Post × Full SW Market -0.0588∗∗∗
(0.0154)
Post × Full SW Market × Concentrated 0.0866∗∗∗
(0.0169)
Post × Full AT Market 0.000106
(0.0164)
Post × Full AT Market × Concentrated 0.0334
(0.0176)
Observations 84661 104923 73809
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.350 0.355
Time Effects? Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions? Y Y Y
Market Demographics? Y Y Y
Competition Variables? Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran? Y Y Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results for the full sample. Markets are denoted as concentrated if they have a premerger HHI of
greater than 2500. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare products
that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been
transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the quarter
level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and geometric
mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate
whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one, two,
or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall
that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table 2.10: Regression Results: Triple Difference Fixed Effects Model Across HHI
Thresholds
1 2 3
Post × Full SW and AT Market -0.0194
(0.0135)
Post × Full SW and AT Market × HHI: 2501-5000 0.0476∗∗
(0.0157)
Post × Full SW and AT Market × HHI: 5001-7500 0.0646∗∗
(0.0215)
Post × Full SW and AT Market × HHI: 7501-10,000 0.0554∗∗
(0.0185)
Post × Full SW Market -0.0585∗∗∗
(0.0157)
Post × Full SW Market × HHI: 2501-5000 0.0597∗∗∗
(0.0181)
Post × Full SW Market × HHI: 5001-7500 0.0982∗∗∗
(0.0219)
Post × Full SW Market × HHI: 7501-10,000 0.123∗∗∗
(0.0191)
Post × Full AT Market -0.00120
(0.0167)
Post × Full AT Market × HHI: 2501-5000 0.0153
(0.0193)
Post × Full AT Market × HHI: 5001-7500 0.0403
(0.0206)
Post × Full AT Market × HHI: 7501-10,000 0.0482∗
(0.0233)
Observations 84661 104923 73809
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.352 0.357
Time Effects? Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions? Y Y Y
Market Demographics? Y Y Y
Competition Variables? Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran? Y Y Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare
products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would
have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the
quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and
geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that
indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one,
two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall
that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table 2.11: Regression Results: Difference-in-Differences Fixed Effects Model, Carrier Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Full SW and AT Market 0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0676∗∗∗
(0.00855) (0.0143)
Post × Full SW Market 0.0279∗∗ -0.0200
(0.0108) (0.0219)
Post × Full AT Market 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0239
(0.00822) (0.0245)
Observations 59309 62825 59413 12438 11988 11168
Adjusted R2 0.336 0.309 0.329 0.443 0.457 0.423
Carrier Subsample Legacy Legacy Legacy Low Cost Low Cost Low Cost
Time Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Market Demographics? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Competition Variables? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran? N N N N N N
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results for the full sample. Low cost carriers include AirTran, Allegiant, Frontier, Jetblue, Spirit, Sun Country, and Virgin. Legacy carriers include Alaska,
American Airlines, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Republic, US Airways, and United. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare
products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been transported) in the premerger time period are
included. Time effects are dummy variables at the quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and
geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or
more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall that Southwest is not included in the number of low
cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table 2.12: Regression Results: Triple Difference Fixed Effects Model Across Carrier
Type
1 2 3
Post × Full SW and AT Market 0.0499∗∗∗
(0.00857)
Post × Full SW and AT Market × LCC 0.0204
(0.0162)
Post × Full SW Market 0.0281∗∗
(0.0108)
Post × Full SW Market × LCC -0.0507∗
(0.0234)
Post × Full AT Market 0.0355∗∗∗
(0.00822)
Post × Full AT Market × LCC -0.00691
(0.0258)
Observations 71747 74813 70581
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.330 0.342
Time Effects? Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions? Y Y Y
Market Demographics? Y Y Y
Competition Variables? Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran? N N N
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Low cost
carriers include AirTran, Allegiant, Frontier, Jetblue, Spirit, Sun Country, and Virgin. Legacy carriers
include Alaska, American Airlines, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Republic, US Airways, and United. Only
airfare products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers
would have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables
at the quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population,
and geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins
that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service;
one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall
that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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2.12 Figures
Figure 2.1: Two-Stage Hotelling Model of Incumbent and Maverick Firm Entry
Incumbents
0 0.5 1
Hotelling Model Period 1
Entrants
Incumbents
0 0.4 0.5 1
Hotelling Model Period 2
Note: This is an example of how maverick firms may come to enter a market when demand changes over
time but incumbent firms find it costly to move to meet new demand. In the first period, all incumbents
split the entire market, denoted by the red region. In period 2, entrants choose to locate at 0.4, splitting
all the market below 0.4 (blue) and splitting the market with the incumbents between 0.4 and 0.5 (green),
incumbents still split the market above 0.5 with each other (red).
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Figure 2.2: Number of Nonstop Markets Served By Legacy Carriers
Note:This is the number of nonstop markets served per quarter by each of the legacy carriers. Notice the
growth and decline of the firms over time and that Northwest, Continental, and US Airways fall out due to
merger activity.
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Figure 2.3: Number of Connecting Markets Served By Legacy Carriers
Note:This is the number of connecting markets served per quarter by each of the legacy carriers. Notice the
growth and decline of the firms over time and that Northwest, Continental, and US Airways fall out due to
merger activity.
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Figure 2.4: Number of Nonstop Markets Served By Low Cost Carriers
Note:This is the number of nonstop markets served per quarter by each of the low cost carriers carriers.
Notice the growth and decline of the firms over time. Especially noteworthy is the relative size of Southwest
and AirTran in this sample from the DB1B.
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Figure 2.5: Number of Connecting Markets Served By Low Cost Carriers
Note:This is the number of connecting markets served per quarter by each of the low cost carriers carriers.
Notice the growth and decline of the firms over time. Especially noteworthy is the relative size of Southwest
and AirTran in this sample from the DB1B.
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Figure 2.6: Event Study, Full Sample
Note:Results for the full sample. Reference quarter is Q4 2010, the first full quarter after the merger
announcement. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare products that
transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been trans-
ported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the quarter level.
Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and geometric mean
of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate whether
a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one, two, or three or
more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering connecting
service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall that Southwest is
not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated differences between
the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers. Time-invariant market,
carrier, and service fixed effects, along with all interactions are included, as are carrier-time fixed effects.
Copyright c© Alexander McGlothlin, 2020.
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Chapter 3 : Has Anheuser-Busch Let the Steam Out of Craft Beer? The
Economics of Acquiring Craft Brewers
3.1 Introduction1,2,3
In the United States, it has become common for large, established companies to ac-
quire small, innovative firms. In recent years, Walmart, GM, Ford, Apple, Alphabet,
Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft and Yahoo together have acquired over 800
such firms. These acquisitions, being small, often are not publicized outside of trade
and industry circles. However, the economic climate that this strategy of corporate
control creates may significantly alter the entry and exit conditions for new entrants
and can shape the product offerings of incumbent firms that make these acquisitions.
As Wollmann (2019) points out, because of their size, many of these acquisitions fall
outside the scope of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. For this reason, the antitrust au-
thorities at the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission might not
take notice.
In the malt beverage industry, megabrewers such as Anheuser-Busch InBev (AB
InBev or ABI) and SABMiller (MillerCoors) have acquired a number of craft brewers
in the United States. Within beer industry circles, the acquisition of small, local
brewers by large, national brewers is heartening to some and disheartening to oth-
ers.4 On the one hand, the prospect of being acquired at a premium valuation can be
attractive to a pioneering craft brewer and induce entry by aspiring entrepreneurs.
On the other hand, consumers who value craft beer for its small business and local
ownership appeal worry that acquisitions of craft brewers by large incumbent brewers
will taint the cachet of the craft segment.5 Craft brewers who go it alone fear that
1Researcher’s own analyses calculated (or derived) based on data from The Nielsen Company
(US), LLC and marketing databases provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The
University of Chicago Booth School of Business. The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are
those of the author and do not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for and was
not involved in analyzing and preparing the results found in this paper.
2The authors thank Luke W. Haynes for research assistance and Frank Scott, Federico Ciliberto,
Orley Ashenfelter, Alexander MacKay, and attendees of the International Industrial Organization
Conference in Boston and the American Association of Wine Economists Conference in Vienna for
comments and helpful suggestions
3This chapter was based on collaboration with my undergraduate economics professor, Kenneth
G. Elzinga at the University of Virginia. Elzinga is a long-time student of the beer industry who
took me on as a Research Assistant to develop a database on the craft beer segment. Out of that
data trove and other parts of his beer industry library, this essay was formed.
4According to Noel (2018), after the news of Goose Island’s acquisition by ABI sank in, friends
of craft beer concluded: “Goose Island was a sellout. Anheuser-Busch was out to destroy craft beer.
For twenty years, craft beer and Big Beer had been mostly parallel lines. The lines had intersected.”
(p. 177)
5If the cachet of craft beer is based on locally owned, locally brewed product, the size and
geographic footprint of Boston Beer sits outside both of these metrics. Boston Beer (primary brand,
Samuel Adams) had sales in 2018 of 4.3 million barrels, making it the sixth largest brewer in the
United States (Steinman, 2019a). Jim Koch, the founder of Boston Beer, is a member of the
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their access to distribution channels will be foreclosed relative to that of the acquired
craft brewers. Testing whether megabrewer-craft brewer combinations have anticom-
petitive consequences for independent craft brewers and their customers is the theme
of this paper.
3.2 The Craft Beer Segment: A Brief History
The year 1965 marks the taproot of the craft beer industry in the United States,
when Fritz Maytag assumed ownership of the Anchor Steam Beer Company in San
Francisco and pioneered a way forward for small brewers in the U.S. beer industry
(Elzinga et al., 2015). At the time, the beer industry was highly concentrated and
output was largely homogeneous, consisting of lager beer.
While craft beer got its start with Maytag’s entrepreneurial endeavors, the seg-
ment was slow to realize growth and popularity. Only 100 craft brewers existed in
1987. Since that time, there has been an explosion of new entrants. Over 7,000 craft
breweries now operate in the United States. Most of these are small producers whose
individual market share is de minimus (Elzinga et al., 2015). In fact, small-scale
is part of the official definition put forth by the Brewers Association, which defines
a craft brewer as small,6 independent,7 and, naturally, a brewer8. The growth in
the craft segment has several explanations: a decrease in taxation of craft beer in
1978,9 the expansion of brewpubs after their federal legalization in 1978,10 growth in
personal income, and consumer demand for product variety.11,12
The success of the craft beer movement was achieved in part through the product’s
differentiation compared to the relative homogeneity of the lager beer produced by the
major brewers. Over time, the macrobeer industry evolved into primarily producing a
“light beer” (i.e., low calorie) malt beverage whose popularity allowed the exploitation
of scale economies. Today three of the four leading brands of beer sold in the U.S. are
low-calorie beers.13 Craft beer filled a demand gap that opened in part because of the
close proximity in taste, quality, and price of the major brands. The craft industry
Bloomberg Billionaire group; his stature, and that of the firm he founded, also does not fit the
conventional image of the scrappy craft brewer carving out a niche in an industry dominated by
megabrewers.
6“Annual production of 6 million barrels of beer or less (approximately 3 percent of U.S. annual
sales). Beer production is attributed to a brewer according to rules of alternating proprietorships.”
(Brewer’s Association, nd)
7“Less than 25 percent of the craft brewery is owned or controlled (or equivalent economic inter-
est) by a beverage alcohol industry member that is not itself a craft brewer.” (Brewer’s Association,
nd)
8“Has a TTB Brewers Notice and makes beer.” (Brewer’s Association, nd)
9In 1978, Congress decreased the federal excise tax from $9.00/barrel to $7.00/barrel for the
first 60,000 barrels produced by breweries with less than 2 million barrels in total annual sales.
10While federal law permitted home brewing, legalization at the state level was not completed
until 2013 when the last states, Alabama and Mississippi, legalized home brewing.
11See Tremblay and Tremblay (2011) and Silberberg (1985).
12“American beer drinkers discovered variety. Tastes diversified. Anheuser-Busch could no longer
simply suffocate competition. It needed craft beer. So it bought Goose Island.” (Noel, p. xi)
13Bud Light, Coors Light, and Miller Lite.
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also possesses public policy support, exemplified through the recent decrease of the
federal excise tax on beer, a feature of the Craft Beverage Modernization and Tax
Reform Act.14
Consumer demand for beer in the U.S. is supplied largely by ABI and MillerCoors.
For some years, these firms could ignore the craft segment and did. However, in
recent years, these firms have embarked on a wave of acquisitions of craft brewers.
Craft brewers now produce over 12% of industry output (Brewers Association). The
arrival of the craft segment is the most important contemporary development in the
domestic beer industry. The interest and importance of craft beer is reflected in a
growing literature.15
3.3 Beer Distribution
After Prohibition ended, a three-tier system was mandated in order to prevent the
excesses and moral degradation that purportedly catalyzed the outlawing of alco-
holic beverages under Prohibition. Federal law enabled states to mandate that there
should be an independent distributor (i.e., the additional tier) positioned between
the producer tier and the retailer tier. The supposed goal of requiring a third tier
between the brewer and the retailer was to deter promotional strategies and actions
on the part of a vertically integrated brewer-retailer that might stoke the demand for
alcoholic beverages in such a way as to cause alcoholism or alcohol-induced crime.
The result is that many distributors have contracts with major brewers to sell the
brewers’ products exclusively within a certain geographic region. This creates unique
incentives for a brewer to structure contracts to induce the distributor to market its
product line as opposed to its competitors’ products to on-premise retailers (bars),
as well as off-premise retailers (grocery stores, convenience stores, liquor stores, etc.).
Distributors also may control placement of products within the beer section of
a supermarket or convenience store. As a “category captain,” a distributor may
determine what brands are placed next to each other, and the individual shelf level
or cooler door where particular brands are displayed. Within the industry, shelf
placement and shelf space are important marketing variables. For example, eye level
products or products on an aisle endcap are more likely to be seen and bought by
consumers. Pricing and shelf placement strategies may induce substitution towards
one brand and away from another.
14The Craft and Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act (CBMTRA) went into effect
January 1, 2018 and will “sunset” on December 31, 2019. Under the bill, the federal excise tax
decreased from $7.00/barrel to $3.50/barrel for the first 60,000 barrels of domestic brewers producing
less than 2 million barrels annually (Brewer’s Association, nd).
15The best treatments are Acitelli (2013), The Audacity of Hops: The History of Americas Craft
Beer Revolution and Lewis (2014), We Make Beer: Inside the Spirit and Artistry of Americas Craft
Brewers. Book-length treatments of individual craft brewers include Beyond the Pale: The Story of
Sierra Nevada Brewing Co. by Grossman (2013) and Beer for Petes Sake by Slosberg (1998). Steve
Hindy, one of the founders of The Brooklyn Brewery, also has written a history of craft brewers:
The Craft Beer Revolution (Hindy, 2014).
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3.4 Distribution by the Two Major Brewers
As of 2016, ABI and MillerCoors sold about 2/3 of all beer sold in the U.S.16 Because
of the existence of only two major sellers, there usually are only two major distributors
in any one geographic area, one for the brand portfolio of ABI brands and one for
the brand portfolio of MillerCoors. These same distributors also may contract with
craft brewers in the area who want access to and distribution in their territory. Until
recently, ABI and MillerCoors did not have a product to challenge craft beers in
the market. However, with the acquisition of several craft breweries by the two
dominant macrobrewers, there is now concern among the craft segment that ABI and
MillerCoors will use their influence with distributors to foreclose other craft brewers
from on-premise as well as off-premise accounts. The National Beer Wholesalers
Association spoke to this in a letter to the Department of Justice regarding the
merger between ABI and SABMiller, noting,
“Through incentive programs to promote ABI beers at the expense of ri-
val brands, influence over distribution management, substantial control
through the equity agreement and by other means to control independent
distributors, the DOJ has found that ABI can inhibit craft and rival brew-
ers’ access to the market through ABI’s distribution partners.” (National
Beer Wholesalers Association, 2016)
While the combined ABI and MillerCoors share of market (SOM) is large, it has
been in a free-fall since the start of the twenty-first century. Over the past decade,
ABI’s volume fell almost 20 million barrels, almost all of this decrease taking place
in ABI’s two major brands, Budweiser and Bud Light. This loss in sales is the
equivalent of shuttering four modern breweries. In terms of market share, ABI has
lost approximately eight share points (Steinman, 2019b). This loss in volume took
place notwithstanding the acquisition of ten craft brewers and the acquisition itself
of Anheuser-Busch by InBev.17
While the tailspin at MillerCoors has not matched that of ABI in reduced bar-
relage, in relative terms MillerCoors’ decline has been greater. In the past decade,
MillerCoors’ volume dropped 14.5 million barrels, the equivalent of three modern
breweries. The joint venture of Miller and Coors never experienced a year in which
total sales for the combined firm grew. MillerCoors held a SOM of 30 percent in 2008;
in 2018, the MillerCoors share was just under 24 (Steinman, 2019a). As macrobeer
sales have decreased, their distributors became wary about the future of Big Beer and
16Unless cited otherwise, all figures are from the 2016 Beer Industry Update (Beer Marketer’s
Insights, 2016).
17During this period, Anheuser-Busch has diversified through acquisition into other potables
including tea, energy drinks, hard seltzer, and even spirits. Recently ABI acquired Cutwater Spirits,
a firm founded by the same team that founded Ballast Point, a craft brewer acquired earlier by ABI
(Steinman, 2019a).
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focused their attention on growth sectors such as import brands, craft brands, and
flavored malt beverages.18 The macrobrewers have taken notice.19
Table 3.1 shows U.S. share of beer sales by segment, comparing 2018 to 2013.
In 2013, craft SOM was just under eight share points; Import SOM was just over
thirteen. Imports now stand at just over seventeen; while craft is just over twelve.
Imported beer maintained a consistent segment share lead over craft beer, the delta
between import and craft remaining stable at about five share points.
At one time in the U.S., imported beer primarily meant beer from Canada, Ger-
many, and the Netherlands. No more. Table 3.2 shows the shipments of imported
brands in 2018. Constellation’s portfolio of Mexican brands now has five of the top
ten brands being sold in the U.S. Almost all of the growth in imports is accounted for
by sales growth from South of the border. Note the absence of any import beer among
the top ten brands from North of the border. Once prominent Canadian brands in
the Molson and LaBatt portfolio have faded.
3.5 The Major Brewers and Craft Beer
Prior to the expansion of craft brewers in the United States, the beer industry sus-
tained a dramatic decrease in the number of producers. The number of conventional
lager breweries in the U.S. fell from 421 in 1947 to 20 in 2006, as firms either merged or
exited the market (Elzinga et al., 2015). This drop was the result of economies of scale
in production and marketing, which benefitted the large macrobrewers but pushed
most of the medium-sized brewers out of the market (Elzinga (2016), Tremblay and
Tremblay (2011)).
High profile acquisitions and mergers at the top of the international macrobrewer
food chain also have contributed to the diminishing number of conventional breweries.
In 2002, South African Breweries acquired Miller Brewing Company to form SAB-
Miller. In 2005, Molson Brewery of Canada and Coors Brewing Company merged to
form the Molson Coors Brewing Company. In 2008, SABMiller and Molson Coors
formed the joint venture, MillerCoors, for operations in the United States. Also,
in 2008, Belgian brewing firm, InBev, acquired Anheuser-Busch to create Anheuser-
Busch InBev (ABI).20 ABI engaged in a Brobdingnagian $107 billion merger with
SABMiller in 2016. As a result of that combination, Molson Coors assumed sole
ownership of MillerCoors.
Production of “phantom” craft beer brands was the macrobrewers’ initial response
to the growth of the craft brewing market.21 In 1988, Miller bought Jacob Leinenkugel
Brewing Company, the first such acquisition. In 1995, Miller also purchased Celis
18An example of a flavored malt beverage would be Mike’s Hard Lemonade.
19Kostov (2018) and Bostwick (2018) of the Wall Street Journal both describe how the decrease
in sales of macrobeer such as Bud Light as well as the rise in popularity of craft beer have prompted
distributors to reconsider their business models.
20For a detailed account of the hostile takeover of Anheuser-Busch, see Dethroning the King
(Macintosh, 2011).
21Anheuser-Busch was the first mover in this product space with Elk Mountain Ale in 1994,
followed by Red Wolf Lager brand that same year. Miller followed suit by introducing its Red Dog
brand through Plank Road Brewery, an in-house subsidiary of Miller that focused on craft beer
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Brewery and a 50% share of Shipyard Brewing. In 2000, Miller shut down Celis Brew-
ery and sold Shipyard back to the original owners. With the exception of Leinenkugel,
which went on to become part of Miller’s craft and import business development unit,
Tenth and Blake Beer Company, these initial acquisitions were not distinguished by
their commercial success. The real movement of Big Beer companies acquiring craft
brewers came a decade later when ABI got involved.
3.6 ABI and the Craft Segment
In Barrel-Aged Stout and Selling Out: Goose Island, Anheuser-Busch, and How Craft
Beer Became Big Business, Josh Noel noted “the announcement of Goose Island’s
$38.8 million sale to the world’s largest beer company, on March 28, 2011, functionally
ended an era for craft beer-an era of collaboration and cooperation, growth, and good
vibes, and the shared cause of building a lifeboat in a sea of Big Beer banality (Noel,
p. xi).” Noel added,
“Goose Island reached a unique place in the American craft beer industry.
It was a rare hybrid, serving local, national, and international audiences.
It made beer for Chicago, it made beer for stadiums and airport bars, and
it was a brand to be exported to Europe and China, Australia and South
America. After all the scaling and tweaks, Goose IPA was essentially
Anheuser-Busch IPA. 312 was Anheuser-Busch Wheat Ale... All became
tepid Big Beer reinventions of what they had been when made in Chicago
(Noel, p. 329).”
Goose Island was a natural candidate for acquisition, ABI already had a minority
stake in the company, and it was consistently the second or third largest craft brewer
in the six-state area in and around Illinois each year from 2004-2009 leading up to
the acquisition (as shown in Figure 3.3). In addition to purchasing stakes in Spiked
Seltzer, Virtue Cider, and the Craft Brew Alliance,22 ABI has since purchased nine
other craft breweries under its High End Brands subsidiary:
• Blue Point Brewing Co. (New York-based firm selling 60,000 barrels/year at
time of purchase, acquired in 2014 for an estimated $24 million)
• 10 Barrel Brewing Co. (Oregon-based firm selling 40,000 barrels/year at time
of purchase, acquired in 2014 for an undisclosed amount)
products. The most successful of these phantom brands was Blue Moon, developed by Coors in
1995. MillerCoors now sells over 2 million barrels of Blue Moon per year. Blue Moon’s success
prompted ABI’s 2006 release of its similarly marketed brand Shock Top, which reached an annual
production of 900,000 barrels in 2014.
22The Craft Brew Alliance is a brewing company consisting of five beer and cider brands: Red-
hook, Widmer Brothers, Kona, Omission, and Square Mile Cider. CBA was founded in 2008 and
then in 2013 sold a 32.2% share of the business to ABI, which became the company’s distribution
partner.
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• Elysian Brewing (Washington-based firm selling 54,000 barrels/year at time of
purchase, acquired in 2015 for an undisclosed amount)
• Golden Road Brewing (California-based firm selling 45,000 barrels/year at time
of purchase, acquired in 2015 for an undisclosed amount)
• Four Peaks Brewing Company (Arizona-based firm selling 70,000 barrels/year
at time of purchase, acquired in 2015 for an undisclosed amount)
• Breckenridge Brewery (Colorado-based firm selling 70,000 barrels/year at time
of purchase, acquired in 2015 for an undisclosed amount)
• Devils Backbone Brewing Company (Virginia-based firm selling 60,000 bar-
rels/year at time of purchase, acquired in 2016 for an undisclosed amount)
• Karbach Brewing Company (Texas-based firm selling 40,000 barrels/year at
time of purchase, acquired in 2016 for an undisclosed amount)
• Wicked Weed Brewing (North Carolina-based firm selling 40,000 barrels/year
at time of purchase, acquired in 2017 for an undisclosed amount)
3.7 MillerCoors and the Craft Segment
Other macrobrewers have since made similar acquisitive forays into craft beer. Miller-
Coors acquired Terrapin Beer Company in 2011, Crispin Cider in 2012, Saint Archer
Brewing in 2015, and Revolver Brewing and Hop Valley in 2016. Constellation, the
American distributor of prominent Mexican beers Corona and Modelo, acquired Bal-
last Point in 2015 and Funky Buddha in 2017. Additionally, Heineken USA acquired
a 50% share of Lagunitas in 2015 before purchasing the remaining share of the com-
pany in 2017. This progression of acquisitions reveals the increased desire of Big Beer
to cross the line between macrobrewed lagers and craft beer varieties to capitalize
on the consumer demand for product differentiation and to integrate acquired craft
brewers into their established distribution channels.
3.8 A Case Study
To better understand the economic consequences of craft beer acquisitions by a mac-
robrewer, we examine in detail the consequences of ABI’s acquisition of Goose Island.
Goose Island is a worthy “representative firm” (in Alfred Marshall’s use of the term).
Goose Island was the largest craft brewer in Chicago at the time of its acquisition;
and it was acquired by the largest macrobrewer (ABI).23 The leading brand of Goose
Island was “312” which is the area code for Chicago. What makes our use of the
23“[Goose Island] was an undeniably exciting place to work during an exciting time. The secret
of variety, choice, and innovation was out; everyone wanted a piece of craft beer. Breweries were
opening at the rate of one a day. Chicago had gone from one production brewery-Goose Island-to
nearly a dozen. Goose Island was in the midst of a sixteen-year run of winning twenty-five medals
at the Great American Beer Festival-at least one every year.” (Noel, p. 146)
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acquisition especially fitting (if not ironic) is that Goose Island 312 is now brewed at
an ABI brewery in Baldwinsville, New York (where the area code is 315).24
3.9 AB InBev and Goose Island: The Competition Issue
Economic theory provides several possible strategic responses that could be the con-
sequence of a major brewer acquiring a craft brewer. Given the number of craft
brewers, and the relative ease of entry into the craft segment, it is plausible that craft
brewery acquisitions would have no price effect on craft beer. Thus, if the market for
craft beer were competitive, ABI would have no ability to raise the price of Goose
Island beer, and no incentive to lower its price. Under this scenario, there should be
no antitrust concern.
If the acquiring firm can exploit scale economies in production or take advantage of
distribution economies in promoting the acquired brand to retail accounts, one would
expect a decrease in the price of Goose Island beer and expansion of volume and sales.
If this is the case, the antitrust authorities should applaud such acquisitions.
If ABI’s acquisition of Goose Island affords ABI the ability to raise the price floor
under craft beer by raising the price points of its mainline products (e.g., Budweiser
and Busch), then such acquisitions may harm consumer welfare. Additionally, due
to the regulatory characteristics of the three-tier system, ABI could use its influence
on distributors to foreclose the market to rivals in the craft beer segment. This may
differentially affect states based on the legal regimes that govern their specific markets
for alcoholic beverages, as discussed in Burgdorf (2019). If either of these occur, such
acquisitions merit the attention of the antitrust authorities.
3.10 Data
We use Nielsen scanner data provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center
at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business to explore whether there is
evidence of foreclosure. Specifically, we utilize the Retail Scanner Dataset to observe
sales of beer at the month-store-product level. In the Nielsen dataset, sales are
recorded at the end of each week, and a volume-weighted price is reported, though
we aggregate up to the month level.25 We calculate both the total volume (in ounces)
sold of each beer in each store in addition to the total dollar amount of each beer sold
in each store. We use these to calculate the effective price per ounce of each brand
of beer (e.g., Goose Island 312) at each store and total sales (total revenue) for each
brand of beer at each store.
Due to sales promotions, stockpiling, and uneven consumption around occasions
such as the Super Bowl and the Fourth of July, sales may be choppy at the week
24For a recent (“light” - pun intended) account of ABI’s acquisition of Goose Island, see Noel
(2018).
25Beer sales are not evenly spaced across the week. Because of this, as well as for simplicity during
data aggregation, we count the whole weeks worth of sales in the month that sales are reported. For
instance, if sales are reported on the third of the month, the entire week of sales are recorded as
having occurred in that month.
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level. By aggregating sales to the month in which they were reported, we avoid the
influence of outliers due to holiday or sporting event consumption spikes and the
pitfalls of having too many zeroes in our data. We also reduce the number of data
points, which allows us to expand the geographical scope of our sample and keep the
computational burden of the large size of the Nielsen dataset manageable.
Product characteristics such as brand, package-type, and volume also are included.
We restrict our sample to beer sold in six packs of 11.2 ounce or 12-ounce bottles.26 If
different pack sizes were included, we would have to control for and explain the price
differences due to quantity discounts.27 Additionally, packs including more than six
bottles of beer are often only sold by macrobrewers and large craft brewers who have
invested in the machinery to package larger pack sizes, creating a possible selection
issue. Furthermore, it is unlikely consumers are substituting from six packs to other
multi-packs as they do between six packs. By limiting our analysis to six packs, we
move closer to an apples-to-apples instead of oranges-to-apples comparison.
For our analysis, we develop two samples based on brand information. The first
contains all brands of craft beer sold in the Nielsen dataset. Descriptive statistics
for this sample are located for the premerger time period in Table 3.3 and for the
postmerger time period in Table 3.4. This sample was chosen to ascertain if the merger
had an effect on craft brands in general, as has been feared by fans of the craft beer
segment. As mentioned earlier, most craft brewers produce very little beer, and most
sell primarily through a taproom or brewpub environment, or to on-premise accounts.
Only the most successful brewers place their beer in the channels observed in the
Nielsen dataset. This sample attempts to discern the effects of the acquisition on
these craft brewers. The second sample contains beers produced by macrobrewers.28
This sample was chosen to see if the acquisition allowed the macrobrewers to raise
prices on their brands through the alleviation of competitive pressure from the craft
beer segment. Descriptive statistics for this sample are located for the premerger time
period in Table 3.5 and for the postmerger time period in Table 3.6. From a market
definition perspective, the brands in these two samples may be most likely to suffer
adverse consequences from an acquisition of a craft brewer by a macrobrewer.
When the two megabrewers acquire craft brewers, the antitrust authorities might
be concerned that independent craft brewers will be foreclosed from distribution. In
our case study, the concern would be that ABI will use the acquisition of Goose
Island to foreclose other craft brewers. This can be investigated by analyzing the first
sample consisting of beers sold by craft brewers. If ABI has used Goose Island to
foreclose or weaken competing craft brewers, we would expect quantity sold of craft
beer to decrease. If ABI has created a more efficient rival in Goose Island, we would
26Bottles that contain 11.2 ounce of beer hold one-third of a liter. European brewers and brewers
that follow the European tradition may use this size instead of the 12-ounce size Americans are used
to. To the untrained eye they are the same as those that hold 12 ounces of beer and are frequently
placed next to each other in stores and sold as if they had the same fill.
27It is known that the major brewers engage in price discrimination as part of their competitive
strategy but we can find no precedent in the literature studying this to follow and leave analysis of
price discrimination in the beer industry to future research (Elzinga, 2016).
28We include all beers sold my ABI, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst.
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expect prices to decrease, and quantities to either stay the same or increase, both
procompetitive results.
A second concern is that the acquiring firm will absorb a craft brewer in order to
alleviate the competitive pressure on the acquirer’s own products. Here the concern
would be that ABI will position Goose Island’s pricing in a way that will induce
substitution to the lager brands of the macrobrewers, leading to sustained or increased
prices of these products and growth in their volume. This can be investigated by
analyzing the second sample of beers produced by macrobrewers - consisting of brands
from ABI, MillerCoors, Heineken, Pabst, and Constellation. If ABI is able to position
Goose Island to alleviate competitive pricing pressure on its mainstream brands, we
should observe increased prices in these brands or we should see substitution from
craft beer to mainstream brands, resulting in increased quantity sold.
Store characteristics also are included in this dataset; specifically, we identify the
Designated Market Area (DMA),29 channel type, state, three-digit zip code, FIPS
county code, and FIPS state code.30 We also identify different retailers based on
their store and corporate codes, though the true identity of each particular retailer is
shielded in the dataset.
In addition to this information from Nielsen, we also add control variables for
income, education, alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year
level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. We control for these because each of
these measures is correlated with consumption of beer, and craft beer in particular.
Due to computational limitations, we apply several restrictions to our dataset.
First, we limit our dataset geographically to Midwestern and mid-Atlantic states
that are proximate to Goose Island’s focal point of Chicago and would be the part
of the country most likely to experience the effects, if any, of an aggressive expansion
of Goose Island sales under the patronage of ABI. The territory we examine includes
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. We
further limit our dataset only to beers sold between 2010 and 2013. This gives us
both a pre- and post-period for the acquisition of Goose Island by ABI.31 The result is
over four million observations at the brand-store-month level in the craft beer sample
and over six million observations in the macrobrewer sample. Using a difference-in-
differences framework, we examine the effect of the merger on volume and pricing of
craft beers and macro lagers.
3.11 Estimation Approach
Recall that the primary concern of competitors of Goose Island in the craft beer seg-
ment is that ABI will exploit distributor relationships to induce substitution towards
Goose Island and away from “true craft” beers. If this is true, the potential effect of
29These regions are determined by Nielsen based upon the regional reach of metro area commercial
TV channels.
30FIPS codes, or Federal Information Processing Standards, are five-digit codes that uniquely
identify counties or county-equivalent jurisdictions in the United States.
31The acquisition occurred on March 28, 2011.
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the merger should be stronger in stores and markets where ABI has a greater share
of market and thus has more influence over their distributors. The National Beer
Wholesalers Association (2016) expressed its concern that ABI
“encourages distributors to drop rival beers and replace it with an ABI
owned “craft” to replace any lost sales. ABI may threaten the ability of a
distributor to transfer its business. The pressure to drop rival beers does
not end there. ABI executives have frequently visited distributors that
choose to sell non-ABI products to encourage them otherwise, and publicly
criticize distributors that carry non-ABI brands at trade meetings.”
To address this, we would like to know the actual share of revenue or profits
generated by ABI for each of its distributors in each of its retail stores. Unfortunately,
that information is not publicly available. However, Nielsen data do allow us to find
the market share at the store-month level captured by ABI products.
The variable ABI Market Share is defined as the premerger market share (deter-
mined by revenue) of ABI branded products for a particular store. We implement
our difference-in-differences model with this as our treatment variable, making this
akin to an intent-to-treat specification. We adopt this because the economic concern
of the merger is that ABI will use its market power to foreclose other craft brewers,
or use its portfolio, now including Goose Island, to move pricing in such a way as
to alleviate pressure on its mainline brands and portfolio in general. We expect that
stores having significant sales of ABI brands in the premerger period should be more
affected than stores whose revenue is largely sourced from other firms due to the
influence of the distribution tier in off-premise sales. This specification also allows us
to drill into the effects of the merger at the store level.
The Goose Island acquisition was announced on March 28, 2011, and we use
this date to demarcate the premerger and postmerger time periods.32 Our standard
errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the store level in all models.33 We
implement a fixed-effects model at the product-store level, which should control for
time-invariant differences in individual stores’ pricing strategies of individual brands.
We model our difference-in-differences framework with five separate specifications
and three outcome variables of interest. Our first specification regresses each depen-
dent variable against a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the post-acquisition
time period (Post), the ABI Market Share variable, and an interaction term of these
two dummy variables (Post x ABI Market Share). Commensurate with the typical
difference-in-differences approach, this interaction term is the variable of interest. If
our estimates are causal, the coefficient on this term will reveal the positive or neg-
ative impact of the acquisition on each of the dependent variables of interest. We
implement several improvements over the nave regression of our first specification.
Our second specification adds yearly time effects and our third specification adds
year and DMA (Designated Market Area) interactions to the yearly time effects of
32The postmerger time period begins in April of 2011 and the premerger time period ends in
March of 2011.
33Note this is individual store level, not retailer level.
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our second specification. Our fourth specification adds year and retailer interactions
to both the yearly effects and the year and DMA interactions. Our fifth, final, and
preferred specification adds the control variables mentioned above to the fixed effects
in the fourth specification.
The fifth specification is preferable for several reasons. First, it includes yearly
time fixed effects to control for the significant growth of the craft beer industry
over this period. Second, it includes year and Designated Market Area interaction
terms. Craft beer demand and growth has a distinct geographical profile. They are
concentrated in certain areas, and both are heterogeneous across areas and time.
These interactions control for this. We include year and retailer interactions because,
within the beer industry, there are distinct differences across channels in terms of
breadth of offerings and types of beer sold.
Typically, selection is wider at liquor stores than supermarkets, where selection is
wider than convenience stores. That said, there is also variation in the selection of
beers offered across different retailers, and even across individual stores within these
channels. Retailers such as Walmart have a different inventory portfolio than Target,
just as Whole Foods will offer different brands and package sizes than Kroger.34
However, due to the three-tier system, retailers may interact with distributors at a
higher level than the individual store. This approach captures more heterogeneity
than the typical channel-level analysis, but also takes into account the idiosyncrasies
of the three-tier system. Moreover, by including the time interaction, we allow these
effects to fluctuate as the craft beer landscape evolves and as retailers respond.
Finally, we include a battery of demographic controls (income, education, alcohol
consumption, and year of brewpub legalization) to control for state level factors that
may affect consumption patterns of craft beer. We choose to do this at the state level
because we are unable to disaggregate available data to the DMA level.
This results in a difference-in-difference model that has the following specification:
log(priceijkmt) = β0 + β1Postt + β2ABI Market Sharek+
β3Post ∗ ABI Market Sharekt + β4Xijkt+
τt + γmt + αkt + δijkm + εijkmt (3.1)
That is, we regress the log of price (or quantity) of a particular brand of beer (i)
sold in a particular store (j) that belongs to a particular retailer (k) in a particular
DMA (m) at a particular time (t) against the difference-in-difference variables and a
battery of controls and fixed effects.
We study three outcome variables of interest: (1) the log of price per ounce; (2) log
of total dollar sales; and (3) the number of competing brands sold in a store. The first
two outcome variables are conventional variables in merger retrospectives. We wish
to know if price has decreased, commensurate with efficiencies dominating merger
related effects, or if price has increased, commensurate with coordination dominating
merger related effects. Similarly, increasing total sales at the brand-store level may
34In the Nielsen dataset, because retailers names are masked, our results do not imply anything
concerning these specific stores.
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be indicative of a procompetitive merger and decreasing total sales may be indicative
of an anticompetitive merger, such as would occur if AB InBev foreclosed other craft
brewers from the market.
The craft beer segment competes for consumer patronage more through product
differentiation than by price. Consumer welfare is a function not only of price but
also quality. For this reason, we include a measure of the number of brands that
compete within a store, to attempt to identify the effect of the acquisition on one
quality metric, product variety. For each craft beer product we calculate the number
of distinct types of craft beers that are sold in the relevant store-month in the sample
of craft beers and for each macro beer product we calculate the number of distinct
types of macro beers that are sold in the relevant store-month for the sample of macro
beers.
3.12 Results: Craft Beer Sample
We find no impact on the price of craft beer due to the acquisition of Goose Island
by ABI. Results are in Table 3.7. This implies that while the acquisition did not
have an anticompetitive effect on consumers from a rise in price of craft beer, there
is also not evidence that the efficiency gains from ABI’s superior technology and
production capability were passed on to consumers of craft beer through aggressive
price competition by Goose Island brands. We are unable to disentangle if this is a
result of efficiencies not being achieved or economic profit not being passed through
to consumers. These results are also consistent with vigorous price competition in the
market for craft beer given that prices did not rise, and may not have fallen because
they were already at a competitive level, which seems likely given the attributes of
the craft beer market explained above.
We do find statistically significant evidence that the volume of sales of craft beer
increased postmerger in stores that had larger market share premerger of ABI prod-
ucts. This implies that the amount of craft beer sold per week has increased in those
stores that may have been more likely to be affected by the acquisition, perhaps as
a result of aggressive marketing of Goose Island by ABI that may have spilled over
to other brands. Results are located in Table 3.8. This suggests that craft brew-
ers have benefitted from ABI’s acquisition and entry into the American craft beer
market, possibly because of ABI’s large advertisement expenditure and availability
in capacity constrained on-premise accounts.
However, results on the impact of the acquisition on the number of craft beer
brands sold, shown in Table 3.9, indicates that the number of distinct craft beer
brands sold has decreased in stores more likely to be affected by the acquisition, as
we found statistically significant and negative effects on the number of competing
craft beer brands sold in stores postmerger with a greater share of premerger ABI
revenue. Together this is interesting, while there seems to be some confirmation
of craft brewers’ fear of being foreclosed on entering stores where ABI has a larger
market share, conditional on gaining shelf space in these stores, the acquisition of
Goose Island appears to be a boon to craft brewers. However, as evidenced by the
explosion in small craft brewers in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 it does not appear that shelf
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space in an off premise establishment is a requisite for entry or sustained success in
the craft brewing industry and that entry conditions are consistent with a vigorously
competitive industry.
3.13 Results: Macro Beer Sample
In terms of movement within macro beers, we find statistically significant evidence
of postmerger increases in the price of macro beer products in stores with larger
premerger ABI market share, but statistically significant evidence of sales decreases
for these products. Results are in Table 3.10 and Table 3.11. That these are opposite
in direction show that while macrobrewers may have tried to jockey their products
to a higher price point with their new portfolio of craft beer, quantity sold was not
maintained and it is unlikely this was profitable. If the price increase was sustained
with no decrease in quantity sold we may be concerned with oligopoly power in these
markets. That we do not observe this is comforting from an antitrust perspective -
the availability of higher priced, higher quality, import and craft beers ensures that
substitution may occur when macro brewers raise prices on their own products and
also constrains their ability to do so. In terms of number of competing macro beer
brands, we find no statistical evidence of change postmerger, and show our results in
Table 3.12.
3.14 Results: Goose Island Sample
Finally, we would like to know the impact of the acquisition on sales of Goose Island
beer itself. We investigate this by looking at a subsample of our craft beer sample
consisting of only Goose Island brands. If the acquisition resulted in increased access
and consumption of Goose Island it would be a boon to consumers, as would any price
decreases passed through from efficiency gains made as a result of the acquisition. We
first look at price effects and find that ABI maintained prices and did not pass through
any achieved efficiencies to consumers, evidenced by no statistically significant impact
on price. Results are located in Table 3.13. Second, we look at sales. If ABI was
aggressive in marketing Goose Island we would expect increases in sales of the brand.
We cannot conclude the coefficient on the difference-in-differences interaction term is
statistically significant but do observe positive coefficients on our regression of sales
of some magnitude, providing weak evidence of an expansion of Goose Island sales
after the ABI acquisition, as expected.
3.15 Regional Analysis: Illinois
It has become apparent that ABI’s acquisitions have a distinct regional flavor to
them. Each of the ten acquisitions is at the heart of a state or metro area that has
seen tremendous growth in the craft segment. For that reason, a natural question
is whether or not there are different effects in the regions these craft brewers are
located compared to larger geographic areas. We first analyze the effect on craft beer
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sold in Illinois. Results are located in Table 3.15. We find much larger effects on
sales and price than our more general analysis, for sales we find an effect almost five
times that estimated in our more general sample as well as larger and statistically
significant effects on price compared to that estimated in the more general sample.
We find a negative effect on the number of brands of craft beer sold in individual
stores more than twice that of our more general sample. It is clear that there have
been much larger merger-related effects in the market for craft beer in Goose Island’s
home state of Illinois than elsewhere. This contrasts with our estimates from our
macro beer sample in Illinois, which are located in Table 3.16. These coefficient
estimates are similar for price and sales effects but larger, negative, and significant
when analyzing the variety of brands of macro beer sold in stores compared to our
more general geographic sample. Finally, we analyzed the impact on sales and price
of Goose Island in Illinois, finding no impact on price but large, positive impacts on
sales after the acquisition of Goose Island ten times that of the estimates from the
more general sample. Results are located in Table 3.17. Together it appears that ABI
has greatly expanded sales of Goose Island in Illinois at the expense of many smaller
craft breweries.
3.16 Channel Level Analysis
We next analyze whether or not the acquisition had heterogeneous effects across
different channel types. The Nielsen database allows us to observe whether each
product was sold in a convenience store, drug store, food (grocery) store, or mass
merchandiser. The exact identity of each of the retailers is hidden and unknown to
us. We re-analyze the price, sales, and product variety effects in our macro, craft,
and Goose Island samples by breaking the data into subsamples for each of these
four types of stores. Results are in Tables 3.18 - 3.25. We observe several interesting
findings. First, we observe that increases in sales of craft beer are driven by stores in
the convenience, drug, and mass merchandiser channels and not in grocery stores. We
find large positive coefficients in these channels that range between roughly two and
four times the magnitude observed in our full sample, and a smaller and statistically
insignificant estimate on the interaction term in the grocery channel. This lends
credence to the theory that ABI is spurring sales of craft beer in these channels
where there is less variety of choice. Conditional on Goose Island being available on
the shelf, ABI may drive more traffic to its own product option. Second, the loss
of sales in macro beers are driven by drug stores but no meaningful loss is observed
among mass merchandisers. This may be an artifact of our sample excluding non six-
pack package sizes, as these two channels sell mainly very large or very small (single)
packages of beer. Nonetheless, while estimates are generally in line with those of the
full sample for convenience and grocery stores, drug stores observe an effect more
than double the magnitude observed in the full sample. Finally, we observe weak
price decreases in price of Goose Island beer in grocery stores as in the full sample,
but large and positive increases in price in mass merchandise stores, suggesting that
craft beer is earning a premium in these channels.
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3.17 Conclusion
One swallow does not make a Spring and one case study of an acquisition does not
prove a proposition. Nonetheless, in watching for Spring we do look for swallows. For
that reason, the ABI-Goose Island acquisition is a fitting case study of the economic
consequences of combining a megabrewer with a prominent craft brewer.35 To the
extent this case study is a harbinger of others, however, the standard price-quantity
consequences studied in merger retrospectives of the ABI-Goose Island combination
fail to confirm the fears that many had that the acquisition of Goose Island by ABI
would hamper other craft brewers and consumers.
If the ABI-Goose Island amalgamation is a reflection of other such combinations,
present and future, our study suggests that beer drinkers are not worse off in terms
of the usual consumer welfare metrics of price and output. To the extent consumers
value the Brandeisian merits of small business and derive utility from the purchasing
the product of locally owned firms, the acquisition of craft brewers by megabrewers
reduces the choice set of (true) craft beers with these attributes. Fortunately, through
the rapid rise of on-premise outlets, the increasing supply of new entrants in the craft
segment comes at a more rapid rate than the current propensity of megabrewers to
acquire them or foreclose them from shelf space in off-premise accounts.
35It is the one such acquisition to merit a book length treatment (Noel, 2018) whose author also
extrapolates the lesson of this combination to the craft segment as a whole.
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3.18 Tables
Table 3.1: Beer Sales by Segment in the US





High End 0.9 0.6
Premium Regular 43.2 32.4
Premium Light 7.7 9.7
Premium 28.2 33.8
Subpremium Regular 35.9 43.6
Subpremium Light 10.0 11.5
Malt Liquor 8.5 9.6
Subpremium 2.1 2.6
No Alcohol 20.6 23.7
Source: Beer Marketer’s Insights
Table 3.2: Top Import Beer Brands in the US
Brand Bbls 2018 Market Share 2018 Bbls 2008
Corona Extra 8,580 23.8 7,940
Modelo Especial 8,180 22.7 1,810
Heineken 3,800 10.6 4,950
Stella Artois 2,675 7.4 755
Dos Equis 1,900 5.3 725
Corona Light 1,125 3.1 925
Guinness 1,110 3.1 980
Corona Familiar 730 2.0
Pacifico 725 2.0 360
Tecate 680 1.9 1,515
Top 10 Brands 29,505 82.0 19,960
Others 6,495 18.0 8,929
Total Imports 36,000 100.0 28,889
Source: Beer Marketer’s Insights
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Table 3.3: Premerger Summary Statistics, Craft Beer Sample
mean sd min max
Six pack price 8.192643 1.348875 .01 24
Six pack sold 9.121971 17.46063 1 1698
Total sales 72.78735 148.2007 .01 15858.57
Goose Island sold in store-week .5444173 .4980234 0 1
ABI market share .2284364 .1168051 0 .9860957
Brewpub legalization year 1987.113 2.356039 1985 1993
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and over 28.04414 4.72663 17.5 36.9
Per capita income (chained 2012 dollars) 48884.35 5264.827 36910 66706
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer 1.214892 .1500962 .89 1.49
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine .3279882 .1025704 .1 .66
Per capita ethanol consumption from spirits .7020477 .1911048 .44 1.36
Total brands sold 112.1514 57.30957 1 331
Craft beer brands sold 44.37833 33.17063 1 189
Observations 1111201
Table 3.4: Postmerger Summary Statistics, Craft Beer Sample
mean sd min max
Six pack price 8.672829 1.44457 .01 65.94
Six pack sold 9.276056 20.14404 .9333333 2663
Total sales 78.15854 188.9804 .01 31929.37
Goose Island sold in store-week .7156956 .4510826 0 1
ABI market share .2289627 .1312322 0 1
Brewpub legalization year 1987.084 2.271642 1985 1993
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and over 29.02666 4.644906 18.5 37.4
Per capita income (chained 2012 dollars) 49900.82 4875.026 37405 68310
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer 1.176728 .1455296 .84 1.46
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine .3541886 .0947028 .1 .72
Per capita ethanol consumption from spirits .72547 .1909979 .46 1.63
Total brands sold 130.2513 67.95475 1 404
Craft beer brands sold 64.28937 46.12406 1 267
Observations 3479193
Table 3.5: Premerger Summary Statistics, Macro Beer Sample
mean sd min max
Six pack price 6.433155 1.355273 .01 20
Six pack sold 12.10633 15.37041 .9333333 1671
Total sales 75.21994 93.34719 .01 8672.49
Goose Island sold in store-week .3956651 .4889932 0 1
ABI market share .3054471 .1716414 0 1
Brewpub legalization year 1987.449 2.627596 1985 1993
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and over 27.85404 4.887537 17.5 36.9
Per capita income (chained 2012 dollars) 48445.99 5686.22 36910 68310
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer 1.192587 .1455707 .89 1.49
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine .3266767 .1031089 .1 .69
Per capita ethanol consumption from spirits .7004236 .178198 .44 1.52
Total brands sold 79.26268 51.63728 1 331
Macro beer brands sold 38.58319 17.03259 1 86
Observations 1953498
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Table 3.6: Postmerger Summary Statistics, Macro Beer Sample
mean sd min max
Six sack srice 6.884017 1.339058 .01 119.615
Six sack sold 12.17785 15.22255 .9333333 1472
Total sales 81.92596 103.0672 .01 9936
Goose Island sold in store-week .5219289 .499519 0 1
ABI market share .2982102 .1720245 0 1
Brewpub legalization year 1987.412 2.579948 1985 1993
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and over 28.82931 4.909575 18.5 37.4
Per capita income (chained 2012 dollars) 49369.57 5386.312 37405 68310
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer 1.159184 .1469885 .84 1.46
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine .3516101 .1004513 .1 .72
Per capita ethanol consumption from spirits .7353005 .1877256 .46 1.63
Total brands sold 89.16157 61.40486 1 404
Macro beer brands sold 37.19947 16.65444 1 84
Observations 4127748
Table 3.7: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Craft Beer Sample (Dependent Variable =
Log of Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.00560 0.000951 0.0000251
(0.00328) (0.00330) (0.00355) (0.00316) (0.00312)
Observations 4589530 4589530 4589530 4589530 4589530
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y
Demographic Controls Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store in a particular
month. Sample includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft
brewer in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz
beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time
x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area).
Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers
is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from
beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 3.8: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Craft Beer Sample (Dependent Variable =
Log of Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.112∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0242) (0.0249) (0.0249)
Observations 4590394 4590394 4590394 4590394 4590394
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y
Demographic Controls Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store in a
particular month. Sample includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition
of a craft brewer in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12
oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the
year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated
Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the
identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol
consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
Table 3.9: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Craft Beer Sample (Dependent Variable =
Number of Brands Sold in Store)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.0186∗ -45.54∗∗∗ -40.59∗∗∗ -29.88∗∗∗ -29.63∗∗∗
(0.00935) (3.173) (2.846) (2.908) (2.886)
Observations 4590394 4590394 4590394 4590394 4590394
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y
Demographic Controls Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the number of craft beer brands sold in a particular store in a particular month.
Sample includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer
in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer
sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time
x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area).
Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers
is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from
beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 3.10: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Macro Beer Sample (Dependent Variable =
Log of Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0423∗∗∗ 0.0294∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗
(0.00259) (0.00259) (0.00247) (0.00236) (0.00238)
Observations 6080662 6080662 6080662 6080662 6080662
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y
Demographic Controls Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store in a particular
month. Sample includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer
sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time
x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area).
Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers
is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from
beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
Table 3.11: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Macro Beer Sample (Dependent Variable =
Log of Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × ABI Market Share -0.00938 -0.0117 -0.0571∗∗∗ -0.0799∗∗∗ -0.0808∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Observations 6081246 6081246 6081246 6081246 6081246
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y
Demographic Controls Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store in a
particular month. Sample includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and
Pabst in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz
beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time
x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area).
Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers
is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from
beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 3.12: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Macro Beer Sample (Dependent Variable =
Number of Brands Sold in Store)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × ABI Market Share -1.874∗∗∗ -1.836∗∗∗ 0.287 -0.344 -0.303
(0.278) (0.277) (0.303) (0.280) (0.282)
Observations 6081246 6081246 6081246 6081246 6081246
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y
Demographic Controls Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the number of macro beer brands sold in a particular store in a particular month.
Sample includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylva-
nia, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in
packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x
Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers is hidden
in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine,
and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
Table 3.13: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Goose Island Beer Sample (Dependent
Variable = Log of Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × ABI Market Share -0.107∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.0345∗∗∗ -0.00720 -0.0125
(0.00990) (0.00990) (0.00956) (0.00874) (0.00836)
Observations 187877 187877 187877 187877 187877
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y
Demographic Controls Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample
includes beer produced by Goose Island in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010
and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are
dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen
defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and
Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income,
education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the
state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 3.14: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Goose Island Beer Sample (Dependent
Variable = Log of Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.422∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.188∗ 0.0609 0.0607
(0.0818) (0.0823) (0.0882) (0.0885) (0.0880)
Observations 187877 187877 187877 187877 187877
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y
Demographic Controls Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store.
Sample includes beer produced by Goose Island in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time
effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and
Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year
and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include
income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the
year the state legalized brewpubs.
Table 3.15: Fixed Effects Model, Craft Beer Sold in Illinois
(1) (2) (3)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.475∗∗∗ 0.0348∗∗ -80.62∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.0121) (13.76)
Observations 586839 586787 586839
Dependent Variable? Log of Sales Log of Price Number of Brands
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Sample includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer
in Illinois between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample.
Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year
and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between
year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include
income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the
year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 3.16: Fixed Effects Model, Macro Beer Sold in Illinois
(1) (2) (3)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.0630 -0.00563 -5.757∗∗∗
(0.0651) (0.00611) (0.889)
Observations 706790 706633 706790
Dependent Variable? Log of Sales Log of Price Number of Brands
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Sample includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in
Illinois between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample.
Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year
and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between
year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include
income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the
year the state legalized brewpubs.
Table 3.17: Fixed Effects Model, Goose Island Beer Sold in Illinois
(1) (2)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.603∗ -0.01000
(0.303) (0.0220)
Observations 66616 66616
Dependent Variable? Log of Sales Log of Price
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Sample includes beer sold by Goose Island in Illinois between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer
sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time
x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area).
Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers
is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from
beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 3.18: Fixed Effects Model, Craft Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent vari-
able = Log of Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.00987 0.0214 -0.00678∗ -0.0124
(0.0112) (0.0128) (0.00312) (0.0146)
Observations 48085 301425 4067326 173558
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store in a particular
month. Sample includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft
brewer in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz
beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time
x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area).
Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers
is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from
beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
Table 3.19: Fixed Effects Model, Craft Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent vari-
able = Log of Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.391∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.0602 0.255∗∗
(0.142) (0.0474) (0.0330) (0.0834)
Observations 48085 301425 4067326 173558
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store in a
particular month. Sample includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition
of a craft brewer in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12
oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the
year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated
Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the
identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol
consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 3.20: Fixed Effects Model, Craft Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent vari-
able = Number of Brands Sold in Store)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × ABI Market Share -1.155 -7.630∗∗ -36.06∗∗∗ -2.369
(1.785) (2.456) (4.037) (2.376)
Observations 48085 301425 4067326 173558
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the number of craft beer brands sold in a particular store in a particular month.
Sample includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer
in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer
sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time
x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area).
Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers
is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from
beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
Table 3.21: Fixed Effects Model, Macro Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent vari-
able = Log of Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.0641∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.0308∗∗∗ 0.0141∗
(0.00608) (0.00869) (0.00267) (0.00639)
Observations 267473 896323 4483428 434022
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store in a particular
month. Sample includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer
sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time
x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area).
Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers
is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from
beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 3.22: Fixed Effects Model, Macro Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent vari-
able = Log of Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × ABI Market Share -0.0607 -0.193∗∗∗ -0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0106
(0.0615) (0.0298) (0.0168) (0.0414)
Observations 267473 896323 4483428 434022
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store in a
particular month. Sample includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and
Pabst in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz
beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time
x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area).
Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers
is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from
beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
Table 3.23: Fixed Effects Model, Macro Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent vari-
able = Number of Brands Sold in Store)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × ABI Market Share -0.985 0.130 -0.311 0.780
(0.905) (0.326) (0.430) (0.651)
Observations 267473 896323 4483428 434022
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the number of macro beer brands sold in a particular store in a particular month.
Sample includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylva-
nia, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in
packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x
Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers is hidden
in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine,
and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 3.24: Fixed Effects Model, Goose Island Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent
variable = Log of Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × ABI Market Share 0.00354 0.0202 -0.0272∗∗ 0.0984∗
(0.00770) (0.0344) (0.0103) (0.0447)
Observations 3677 13349 158450 12401
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store in a particular
month. Sample includes beer produced by Goose Island in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample.
Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year
and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between
year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include
income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the
year the state legalized brewpubs.
Table 3.25: Fixed Effects Model, Goose Island Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent
variable = Log of Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × ABI Market Share -0.105 0.124 0.0973 -0.0411
(0.343) (0.305) (0.113) (0.227)
Observations 3677 13349 158450 12401
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Time × DMA Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Time × Retailer Interactions? Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store
in a particular month. Sample includes beer produced by Goose Island in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are
included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are
interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions
are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer ID (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set).
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at
the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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3.19 Figures
Figure 3.1: Number of Craft Brewers in USA by 2009 Production (bbls)
Figure 3.2: Number of Craft Brewers in USA by 2015 Production (bbls)
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Production by Craft Brewers in the Midwest (Goose Island
in red) (bbls)
Copyright c© Alexander McGlothlin, 2020.
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Chapter 4 : A Conclusion to Mergers Involving Maverick Firms
The two analyses of this dissertation confirm the Guidelines’ stance that mergers
involving maverick firms should be afforded special scrutiny. That the merger between
Southwest and AirTran resulted in multiple times the price increase observed in a
previous merger involving two non-maverick firms and that small craft brewers seem
to be foreclosed from off-premise shelf space should give pause to policymakers when
they consider how to treat future mergers involving maverick firms.
However, it also must be said that the two markets these mergers occur in should
also be taken into consideration when assessing these results. In the airline industry
there are high barriers to entry. There are large fixed costs involved in starting an
airline that include leasing planes, training staff, and securing landing slots in order
to create a network of routes to create an attractive air travel product for consumers.
Additionally, the small number of players and high concentration in the industry
makes it especially conducive to tacit collusion and the public availability of pricing
data lowers the cost to firms of monitoring rivals.
A merger that involves a maverick acquiring another maverick should spur par-
ticular concern. Because the loss of a maverick in markets both compete may have
anticompetitive impacts on both maverick firms and non-maverick firms, and the loss
of potential competition from a maverick may impact those markets where only one
of the merging entities operated premerger, the incentives that the new firm may face
must be taken into account. The Department of Justice cited the fact that competi-
tion would be maintained because there were landing slots available at airports and on
routes of concern where entry would likely occur if prices were raised to economically
profitable levels. However, to the extent that entry is associated with competitive
pricing this appears to not have been the case. Moreover, future analysis of mergers
involving two maverick firms should take seriously the question of whether the acqui-
sition is occurring to alleviate the competitive pressure faced by the acquiring firm as
a result of the target maverick firm. It should be evident that the predicted efficiencies
will be achieved and passed through to the consumer. In competitive markets prices
did appear to decrease, however in highly concentrated markets efficiencies were not
passed through and in markets where Southwest competed and AirTran did not there
were large increases in price consistent with the acquisition resulting in the reduction
of competitive pressure felt by Southwest due to AirTran.
In the second chapter, it is clear that consumers may benefit from acquisitions of
mavericks by dominant incumbent firms such as those between startups and Big Tech.
That prices were maintained at a previous competitive level and that the market for
craft beer expanded to a greater degree in off-premise accounts more likely to be
influenced by ABI lend credence to the theory that dominant incumbents acquire
small disruptive firms in order to supercharge their growth. If this is happening in
other markets and industries, policy should encourage incentivizing entrepreneurs to
develop innovative and disruptive products by allowing them to reap the financial
rewards that come by acquisition. However, it is clear from the reduction in choice
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and variety in stores more likely to be affected by the acquisition that to the extent
that it impedes the growth of future disruptors these acquisitions should be viewed
with caution.
Fortunately for the competitive craft brewing industry, barriers to on-premise
sales and the liberalization of alcohol sales regulations across the 50 states have en-
sured that access to off-premise accounts is unnecessary for entry and success in this
industry. This is clear from the growth of the number of craft brewers in the United
States and the increasing share of market that they are capturing. Here also lies a
valuable lesson. To the extent that distribution and access to consumers is controlled
by an acquiring firm, the acquisition of a maverick firm by a dominant incumbent
firm may result in decreased consumer welfare due to restricted quality and quantity
of offerings. However, a competitive market seems to be the vaccine necessary to
protect consumers from feeling the pain of lost innovation and competition.
-AJM
Copyright c© Alexander McGlothlin, 2020.
76
Online Appendix, Mavericks and mergers in concentrated markets
Parallel Trends
Figure A.1: Parallel Trends, Main Specification
Note: Parallel trends of unconditional passenger weighted mean airfare across markets where Southwest,
AirTran, or both competed in all quarters premerger compared to markets where they competed in no
quarter premerger. These are unconditional passenger-weighted means of airfare across treatment and control
markets before and after the merger. Time zero is the close of the merger (Q2 2011). Some divergence of
the two trends is present postmerger.
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Figure A.2: Parallel Trends, Main Specification, Alternative Treatment Variables
Note: Parallel trends of unconditional passenger weighted mean airfare across markets where Southwest,
AirTran, or both competed in at least one quarter premerger compared to markets where they competed
in no quarter premerger. These are unconditional passenger-weighted means of airfare across treatment
and control markets before and after the merger. Time zero is the close of the merger (Q2 2011). Some
divergence of the two trends is present postmerger.
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Figure A.3: Parallel Trends, Concentrated vs Unconcentrated Markets
Note: Parallel trends of the difference in unconditional passenger weighted mean airfare between concen-
trated and unconcentrated markets across markets where Southwest, AirTran, or both competed in all
quarters premerger compared to markets where they competed in no quarter premerger. These are uncondi-
tional passenger-weighted means of airfare across treatment and control markets before and after the merger.
Time zero is the close of the merger (Q2 2011). Some divergence of the two trends is present postmerger.
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Figure A.4: Parallel Trends, Concentrated vs Unconcentrated Markets, Alternative
Treatment Variables
Note: Parallel trends of the difference in unconditional passenger weighted mean airfare between concen-
trated and unconcentrated markets across markets where Southwest, AirTran, or both competed in at least
one quarter premerger compared to markets where they competed in no quarter premerger. These are
unconditional passenger-weighted means of airfare across treatment and control markets before and after
the merger. Time zero is the close of the merger (Q2 2011). Some divergence of the two trends is present
postmerger.
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Figure A.5: Parallel Trends, Maverick vs Non-Maverick Firms
Note: Parallel trends of the difference in unconditional passenger weighted mean airfare between legacy
and low cost carrier across markets where Southwest, AirTran, or both competed in all quarters premerger
compared to markets where they competed in no quarter premerger. These are unconditional passenger-
weighted means of airfare across treatment and control markets before and after the merger. Time zero is
the close of the merger (Q2 2011). Some divergence of the two trends is present postmerger.
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Figure A.6: Parallel Trends, Maverick vs Non-Maverick Firms, Alternative Treatment
Variables
Note: Parallel trends of the difference in unconditional passenger weighted mean airfare between legacy
and low cost carrier across markets where Southwest, AirTran, or both competed in at least one quarter
premerger compared to markets where they competed in no quarter premerger. These are unconditional
passenger-weighted means of airfare across treatment and control markets before and after the merger. Time
zero is the close of the merger (Q2 2011). Some divergence of the two trends is present postmerger.
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Summary Statistics
Table B.1: Summary Statistics (products in markets both firms competed in at least
one quarter premerger)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 167.6193 46.19723 65.05872 1122.991
HHI 3367.51 1654.94 1132.455 9883.826
Origin City Population 4267328 3938448 612297 1.96e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 43121.2 7079.401 32240 60771
Destination City Population 4204321 3841074 612297 1.96e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 43124.19 7007.401 32240 60771
Market Size 22141.02 16753.61 1153 103917
Carrier Passengers 6490.436 6687.988 136 39071
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 5.791264 1.36483 1 8
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers 1.840235 .9609359 0 6
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 2.202856 1.584777 0 8
Number of Nonstop LCC Carriers .7952961 .7822446 0 3
Observations 11905
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics (products in markets Southwest competed in every
quarter premerger)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 158.5333 56.70634 40.19587 2098.22
HHI 5182.738 2506.021 1295.872 10000
Origin City Population 3015515 2692954 140948 1.28e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 41316.99 6986.432 22173 70564
Destination City Population 3033276 2720924 140948 1.28e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 41321.25 7030.814 22173 70564
Market Size 15835.89 19057.88 641 142439
Carrier Passengers 6895.335 8088.112 8 68295
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 3.967832 1.989721 0 8
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers .3738355 .5941962 0 3
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 1.392706 1.556423 0 8
Number of Nonstop LCC Carriers .1441198 .363481 0 2
Observations 12559
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Table B.3: Summary Statistics (products in markets Southwest competed in at least
one quarter premerger)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 160.8532 61.67292 40.19587 2098.22
HHI 5133.397 2480.619 1295.872 10000
Origin City Population 3216900 3218859 140948 1.96e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 41712.14 7275.417 22173 70564
Destination City Population 3311751 3392854 140948 1.96e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 41766.42 7329.037 22173 70564
Market Size 15833.99 18971.09 233 142439
Carrier Passengers 6793.797 7963.372 8 68295
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 4.006944 1.980127 0 8
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers .3778533 .5940182 0 3
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 1.436729 1.565551 0 8
Number of Nonstop LCC Carriers .1535052 .3715877 0 2
Observations 13537
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Table B.4: Summary Statistics (products in markets AirTran competed in every
quarter premerger)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 164.5623 47.12866 53.10074 472.7694
HHI 4672.765 1704.881 1347.454 9440.935
Origin City Population 4110194 3363506 185265 1.96e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 41882.32 6744.829 29459 60771
Destination City Population 4069182 3374357 185265 1.96e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 41779.17 6623.215 29459 60771
Market Size 18215.23 16452.81 1065 98833
Carrier Passengers 7388.6 8452.608 287 63919
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 4.929965 1.724881 0 8
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers 1.230912 .6471468 0 3
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 1.974921 1.324778 0 7
Number of Nonstop LCC Carriers .7637005 .604613 0 2
Observations 5383
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Table B.5: Summary Statistics (products in markets AirTran competed in at least
one quarter premerger)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 173.2277 56.29233 37.47603 926.628
HHI 4727.453 1785.511 1347.454 9987.908
Origin City Population 4763535 4767725 185265 1.96e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 42356.88 6942.93 29459 60771
Destination City Population 4730430 4715803 185265 1.96e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 42371.16 6918.389 29459 60771
Market Size 18256.32 17125.26 803 98833
Carrier Passengers 7367.265 8695.008 87 63919
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 5.014332 1.77832 0 8
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers 1.113746 .7199546 0 3
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 1.977329 1.379796 0 7
Number of Nonstop LCC Carriers .6763518 .6302324 0 2
Observations 7675
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Table B.6: Summary Statistics (products of low cost carriers)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 133.835 56.8566 26.70188 377.5225
HHI 5648.242 2956.285 1132.455 10000
Origin City Population 4626701 5429959 75238 2.02e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 47011.3 10439.56 21171 87643
Destination City Population 4615681 5428536 75238 2.02e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 47002.02 10437.43 21171 87643
Market Size 21634.1 26286.75 213 163252
Carrier Passengers 6888.016 7924.412 1 52097
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 2.836758 2.012338 0 8
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers .9902876 1.15193 0 6
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 1.2609 1.464517 0 8
Number of Nonstop LCC Carriers 1.174022 .5067331 0 4
Observations 18739
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Table B.7: Summary Statistics (products of legacy carriers)
mean sd min max
Average Fare 219.5369 62.29675 56.42365 3613.837
HHI 4425.062 2118.864 1132.455 10000
Origin City Population 4939085 4901751 60464 2.02e+07
Origin City Per Capita Income 48567.43 9600.613 21171 118295
Destination City Population 4948603 4918002 60464 2.02e+07
Destination City Per Capita Income 48596.69 9602.334 21171 118295
Market Size 17268.67 19987.52 205 163252
Carrier Passengers 4853.572 7319.666 1 63919
Number of Connecting Legacy Carriers 3.835901 1.488964 0 8
Number of Connecting LCC Carriers .9231542 1.091449 0 6
Number of Nonstop Legacy Carriers 1.910589 1.251343 0 8




Table C.1: Regression Results: Triple Difference Fixed Effects Model Across Concen-
trated and Unconcentrated Markets
1 2 3
Post × Concentrated -0.0948∗∗∗ -0.0960∗∗∗ -0.0890∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0132) (0.0126)
Post × Any SW and AT Market -0.0263∗
(0.0122)
Post × Any SW and AT Market × Concentrated 0.0675∗∗∗
(0.0138)
Post × Any SW Market -0.0638∗∗∗
(0.0150)
Post × Any SW Market × Concentrated 0.0877∗∗∗
(0.0166)
Post × Any AT Market -0.00739
(0.0159)
Post × Any AT Market × Concentrated 0.0270
(0.0172)
Observations 105601 109727 83488
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.349 0.355
Time Effects? Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions included? Y Y Y
Market Demographics Included? Y Y Y
Competition Variables Included? Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran Included? Y Y Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare
products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would
have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the
quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and
geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that
indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one,
two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall
that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table C.2: Regression Results: Triple Difference Fixed Effects Model Across HHI
Thresholds
1 2 3
Post × Any SW and AT Market -0.0275∗
(0.0124)
Post × Any SW and AT Market × HHI: 2501-5000 0.0501∗∗∗
(0.0148)
Post × Any SW and AT Market × HHI: 5001-7500 0.0507∗
(0.0202)
Post × Any SW and AT Market × HHI: 7501-10,000 0.0689∗∗∗
(0.0207)
Post × Any SW Market -0.0636∗∗∗
(0.0154)
Post × Any SW Market × HHI: 2501-5000 0.0620∗∗∗
(0.0178)
Post × Any SW Market × HHI: 5001-7500 0.0957∗∗∗
(0.0214)
Post × Any SW Market × HHI: 7501-10,000 0.124∗∗∗
(0.0198)
Post × Any AT Market -0.00882
(0.0160)
Post × Any AT Market × HHI: 2501-5000 0.0104
(0.0185)
Post × Any AT Market × HHI: 5001-7500 0.0295
(0.0202)
Post × Any AT Market × HHI: 7501-10,000 0.0526
(0.0324)
Observations 105601 109727 83488
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.350 0.357
Time Effects? Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions included? Y Y Y
Market Demographics Included? Y Y Y
Competition Variables Included? Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran Included? Y Y Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare
products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would
have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the
quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and
geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that
indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one,
two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall
that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table C.3: Regression Results: Difference-in-Differences Fixed Effects Model, Carrier Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Any SW and AT Market 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗
(0.00745) (0.0119)
Post × Any SW Market 0.0225∗ 0.000580
(0.0104) (0.0192)
Post × Any AT Market 0.0227∗∗ 0.0132
(0.00819) (0.0161)
Observations 71245 66427 67905 14819 12437 12009
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.309 0.327 0.463 0.459 0.436
Carrier Subsample Legacy Legacy Legacy Low Cost Low Cost Low Cost
Time Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Market Demographics Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Competition Variables Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran Included? N N N N N N
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Results for the full sample. Low cost carriers include AirTran, Allegiant, Frontier, Jetblue, Spirit, Sun Country, and Virgin. Legacy carriers include Alaska,
American Airlines, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Republic, US Airways, and United. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare
products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been transported) in the premerger time period are
included. Time effects are dummy variables at the quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and
geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or
more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall that Southwest is not included in the number of low
cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table C.4: Regression Results: Triple Difference Fixed Effects Model Across Carrier
Type
1 2 3
Post × Any SW and AT Market 0.0488∗∗∗
(0.00748)
Post × Any SW and AT Market × LCC -0.00519
(0.0137)
Post × Any SW Market 0.0226∗
(0.0104)
Post × Any SW Market × LCC -0.0225
(0.0211)
Post × Any AT Market 0.0219∗∗
(0.00818)
Post × Any AT Market × LCC -0.00335
(0.0172)
Observations 105601 78864 79914
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.330 0.343
Time Effects? Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions included? Y Y Y
Market Demographics Included? Y Y Y
Competition Variables Included? Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran Included? Y Y Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Low cost
carriers include AirTran, Allegiant, Frontier, Jetblue, Spirit, Sun Country, and Virgin. Legacy carriers
include Alaska, American Airlines, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Republic, US Airways, and United. Only
airfare products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers
would have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables
at the quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population,
and geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins
that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service;
one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall
that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table C.5: Regression Results: Difference-in-Differences Fixed Effects Model, Carrier-Time Fixed Effects Excluded
1 2 3 4 5 6
Post × Full SW and AT Market 0.0545∗∗∗
(0.00701)
Post × Full SW Market 0.00414
(0.00768)
Post × Full AT Market 0.0418∗∗∗
(0.00693)
Post × Any SW and AT Market 0.0512∗∗∗
(0.00655)
Post × Any SW Market 0.00260
(0.00772)
Post × Any AT Market 0.0267∗∗∗
(0.00740)
Observations 84661 104923 73809 105601 109727 83488
Adjusted R2 0.257 0.221 0.244 0.275 0.214 0.240
Time Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions included? N N N N N N
Market Demographics Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Competition Variables Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Low cost carriers include AirTran, Allegiant, Frontier, Jetblue,
Spirit, Sun Country, and Virgin. Legacy carriers include Alaska, American Airlines, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Republic, US Airways, and United. Only
airfare products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been transported) in the premerger time period
are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and
geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or
more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall that Southwest is not included in the number of low
cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table C.6: Regression Results: Difference-in-Differences Fixed Effects Model, Southwest and AirTran Excluded
1 2 3 4 5 6
Post × Full SW and AT Market 0.0518∗∗∗
(0.00793)
Post × Full SW Market 0.0250∗
(0.0103)
Post × Full AT Market 0.0352∗∗∗
(0.00797)
Post × Any SW and AT Market 0.0464∗∗∗
(0.00678)
Post × Any SW Market 0.0209∗
(0.00980)
Post × Any AT Market 0.0217∗∗
(0.00770)
Observations 71747 74813 70581 86064 78864 79914
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.330 0.342 0.371 0.330 0.343
Time Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Market Demographics Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Competition Variables Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran Included? N N N N N N
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Low cost carriers include AirTran, Allegiant, Frontier, Jetblue,
Spirit, Sun Country, and Virgin. Legacy carriers include Alaska, American Airlines, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Republic, US Airways, and United. Only
airfare products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been transported) in the premerger time period
are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and
geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or
more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall that Southwest is not included in the number of low
cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table C.7: Regression Results: Difference-in-Differences Fixed Effects Model, All Quarters Included
1 2 3 4 5 6
Post × Full SW and AT Market 0.0445∗∗∗
(0.00714)
Post × Full SW Market 0.0190∗
(0.00964)
Post × Full AT Market 0.0277∗∗∗
(0.00721)
Post × Any SW and AT Market 0.0410∗∗∗
(0.00614)
Post × Any SW Market 0.0145
(0.00930)
Post × Any AT Market 0.0179∗∗
(0.00687)
Observations 93396 115808 81727 116395 121076 92526
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.350 0.357 0.388 0.348 0.356
Time Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Market Demographics Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Competition Variables Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Low cost carriers include AirTran, Allegiant, Frontier, Jetblue,
Spirit, Sun Country, and Virgin. Legacy carriers include Alaska, American Airlines, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Republic, US Airways, and United. Only
airfare products that transported at least 200 passengers in the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been transported) in the premerger time period
are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and
geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income. Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or
more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers
offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall that Southwest is not included in the number of low
cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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Table C.8: Regression Results: Difference-in-Differences Fixed Effects Model, Weighted by Passengers Carried
1 2 3 4 5 6
Post × Full SW and AT Market 0.0285∗∗∗
(0.00311)
Post × Full SW Market 0.0165∗∗∗
(0.00304)
Post × Full AT Market -0.00865∗∗
(0.00316)
Post × Any SW and AT Market 0.0227∗∗∗
(0.00245)
Post × Any SW Market 0.00871∗∗
(0.00290)
Post × Any AT Market -0.0163∗∗∗
(0.00255)
Observations 84661 104923 73809 105601 109727 83488
Adjusted R2 0.883 0.876 0.873 0.877 0.867 0.875
Time Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Market Demographics Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Competition Variables Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare products that transported at least 200 passengers in
the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the
quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income.
Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one,
two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or
more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
97
Table C.9: Regression Results: Difference-in-Differences Fixed Effects Model, Winsorized Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6
Post × Full SW and AT Market 0.0527∗∗∗
(0.00793)
Post × Full SW Market 0.0252∗
(0.0103)
Post × Full AT Market 0.0353∗∗∗
(0.00796)
Post × Any SW and AT Market 0.0481∗∗∗
(0.00679)
Post × Any SW Market 0.0211∗
(0.00983)
Post × Any AT Market 0.0219∗∗
(0.00769)
Observations 84661 104923 73809 105601 109727 83488
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.349 0.354 0.388 0.348 0.354
Time Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Carrier by Time Interactions included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Market Demographics Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Competition Variables Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Southwest and AirTran Included? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Results for the full sample. Dependent variable is the log of the product’s average fare. Only airfare products that transported at least 200 passengers in
the DB1B (thus in real life 2000 passengers would have been transported) in the premerger time period are included. Time effects are dummy variables at the
quarter level. Market demographics variables include geometric mean of route endpoints’ population, and geometric mean of route endpoints’ per capita income.
Competition variables are dummy variable bins that indicate whether a market has one, two, or three or more legacy carriers offering connecting service; one,
two, or three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service; one, two, or three or more low cost carriers offering connecting service; or one, two, or three or
more low cost carriers offering nonstop service. Recall that Southwest is not included in the number of low cost carriers because of the empirically demonstrated
differences between the presence of Southwest in a market and the presence of other low cost carriers.
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